Al-Qaida: Now Vying For Hearts, Minds And Land
Al-Qaida has been subtly testing a new strategy. In the past couple
of years, the group's affiliates have been trying their hand at
governing — actually taking over territory and then trying to win over
citizens who live there. It happened with various degrees of success in
Somalia and Yemen, and recently in the northern deserts of Mali.
There is a
tendency in the West to view al-Qaida as a straightforward terrorist
organization whose only goal is to wreak havoc. I think it is a mistake
to think that way. Al-Qaida wants to provide a way of life; it wants to
implement its own version of Islamic law.
To understand what al-Qaida is trying to do, one
has to go back to 2005 when an arm of the terrorist group decided to
take control of part of Iraq. The local affiliate was called al-Qaida in
Iraq, and it tried to establish a local caliphate, a local emirate.
"It
went horribly wrong," says Peter Neumann, a professor of security
studies at King's College London. "They were abusing the people they
were governing. They were imposing very harsh rules, and they were going
against tribal structures. Ultimately the local people turned against
them."
Specifically, they turned against Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. In his early days in
Iraq, Zarqawi focused on Western targets. He bombed the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad's Green Zone and Western hotels in Jordan.
Then
he became a master of suicide bombings and started focusing on Shiite
civilians. His bombers ignited suicide vests in open air markets and in
popular cafes.
Eventually local Iraqis
realized that al-Qaida's attacks were killing more Iraqis than
Americans, and they began to side with the U.S. Tips flooded in to U.S.
intelligence forces in Iraq, and a short time later the Americans found —
and killed — Zarqawi in 2006.
Need To Connect With Local People
Neumann says that the lessons from Iraq were not lost on al-Qaida.
"There
was a huge amount of soul-searching going on within the movement
afterwards," he says. "And the conclusion was that al-Qaida would have
to immerse themselves with the people rather than go against them."
And al-Qaida has tried to do that in Somalia,
Yemen and, more recently, Mali. In Somalia, an al-Qaida-linked group
called al-Shabab had been holding areas around the capital, Mogadishu,
for months, only to be repelled by African Union troops this past
spring.
Similarly, the southern part of Yemen
— particularly in Abyan and Shabwa provinces — had become al-Qaida
territory. Yemeni forces, aided by U.S. military advisers and
airstrikes, recently drove most of the al-Qaida fighters from the area.
Mali is still up for grabs.
Even though the
groups appear to be on their back foot now, it doesn't change what is
clearly a new strategy for the terrorist network.
"There
is a tendency in the West to view al-Qaida as a straightforward
terrorist organization whose only goal is to wreak havoc. I think it is a
mistake to think that way," says Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert at
Princeton University. "Al-Qaida wants to provide a way of life; it wants
to implement its own version of Islamic law."
And to do that, they need something fundamental: land.
Trying To Govern In Yemen
Al-Qaida's
arm in Yemen, known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is
the group Johnsen has studied most. He says that in 2011 and 2012, AQAP
started taking over towns in southern Yemen — reinventing itself in a
matter of speaking by changing its name to Ansar al-Sharia, or
Supporters of Islamic Law. The new group had essentially exactly the
same membership as AQAP, but the new name was meant to project a kinder,
gentler image.
That's
ultimately the lesson from Hamas. [The Islamist group governing the Gaza
Strip] is so difficult to counter as a military force not because of
their military strength, but because they are so immersed within the
population.
Al-Qaida's softer approach came around the same
time that the Arab Spring had started. The Yemeni government of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh had all but crumbled. The Yemeni military
wasn't putting up much of a fight, so AQAP made a land grab.
"They
were administering the towns, and really they were essentially the de
facto government there," says Johnsen. "It was al-Qaida who was
providing services, al-Qaida who was providing teachers, and running the
police forces and so forth. As difficult as it is to believe, al-Qaida
was doing a better job of providing services to some of these areas than
the Yemeni government had been doing for decades."
Obama
administration officials have a more skeptical view of how well
al-Qaida governed the areas it controlled, and they say that the
territory was tiny. But given that the Yemeni government had been
virtually absent for so long, even a day of electricity or a policeman
on duty went a long way.
Not What Bin Laden Wanted
There's
a precedent for what al-Qaida is doing. Other violent groups have tried
to win over supporters by providing social services — a tactic that has
been effective.
"That's ultimately the
lesson from Hamas," says Neumann of King's College, referring to the
Islamists who govern the Gaza Strip. "Hamas is so difficult to counter
as a military force not because of their military strength, but because
they are so immersed within the population."
What's
so interesting about the al-Qaida strategy is that it defies Osama bin
Laden's wishes. Letters discovered in bin Laden's compound in Pakistan
show bin Laden telling leaders from the group's arm in Yemen not to
attempt to take over territory. Bin Laden said the group didn't have the
ability to govern.
Johnsen says the leaders
of AQAP have rationalized their defiance today by saying bin Laden's
directive has been taken over by events.
That's
not to say that AQAP has been able to hold onto some of the territorial
gains it has made. The U.S. military has been helping the Yemeni
military drive the group from its safe havens in the southern part of
the country.
But Johnsen says the group
clearly thinks the retreat is only temporary. In letters that AQAP left
in the Yemeni cities of Jaar, Shaqra and Azzan after decamping, the
group essentially said it would "be back."
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