The many loopholes of a Syrian ceasefire deal

Image Credit: REUTERS 

The Syrian war has dragged on for so long for a variety of conflicting and complicated reasons — one being total lack of imagination. Both sides have tried, for six long years, to defeat their enemies with a clear-cut military victory on the battlefield, but have realised that this is becoming very difficult. Neither has been able — or willing — to invent something creative until Russian President Vladimir Putin came up with a formula last Tuesday, which was signed off by the Turks and Iranians at the last session of talks in Astana on Thursday. It has also been discussed with United States President Donald Trump and seemingly been approved by him as well.

From a nationalistic perspective, the agreement is a disaster for all Syrians because it permanently empowers foreign players to interfere with their domestic affairs and even legitimises their troop deployment. From a humanitarian perspective, though, it is very good news because it offers to ease the suffering and raises hope to save lives. Politically, it prevents any side from saying “I won”, and allows them to say “ ... well, at least I did not lose”.

The Russian proposal, which will be implemented from today, basically builds on Trump’s frequent reference to a no-fly zone, modifying it slightly to become “de-conflict zones” in four parts of the war-torn country. The four areas of de-escalation are the city of Idlib in the Syrian northwest, held by a coalition of Islamic forces led by Jabhat Al Nusra since mid-2015; north of the midland city of Homs, where the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) is dominant; Al Gouta, the eastern countryside of Damascus, held by the Saudi-backed Jaysh Al Islam since 2012; and the city of Daraa in the Syrian south, also divided between Islamic groups and the FSA.

The Syrian Army will no longer be allowed to fly over any of these territories, let alone carry out military operations within them, but they will remain under the control of the Syrian government, to be administered by a civil authority, with no tanks, military jets or artillery. The rebels will get to keep their light arms and to co-administer these four territories, running their checkpoints and daily affairs in cooperation with Syrian authorities, who will be expected to re-open police stations, schools and provide basic services like water and electricity. Putin hopes that once peace is restored to these four coflict zones, both sides will unite their efforts in combating Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and Al Qaida. When that happens, displaced civilians from these towns and cities will be allowed to return home, without arrest or harassment, easing the pressure on host countries like Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon.

The proposal is not perfect. No doubt it is riddled with flaws and many see it as a “soft” partitioning of the country. The draft agreement clearly excludes all parts of Syria already incorporated in Russian or US spheres of influence. It says nothing about Al Raqqa for example, the self-proclaimed capital of Daesh, or all territory east of the Euphrates River, which are rapidly becoming part of a US-backed Kurdish enclave, and nothing about the border strip of Jarablus, Al Bab, and Azaz, held by the Turkish Army since last August. It also fails to mention any ceasefire or power-sharing formula in cities like Damascus, Tartous, Latakia and Afrin, all part of Russia’s fiefdom, or those of Iran in western Damascus.

Other flaws include nothing on the fate of prisoners. No specific mention of the right of return, and nothing on how these cities will be disarmed, or how violations of the ceasefire will be handled. It also fails to mention accountability on both sides of the conflict. The Putin agreement also does not specify whether residents of these conflict zones will be confined within their borders or allowed to move freely throughout the rest of Syria.

Finally, the Russian proposal does not specify the future form of government in these territories. Will Damascus still appoint their municipality councils and governors, or will they get semi-autonomy and the right to elect their own local administration? For that to happen, they would need new legislation; a new election law and a new law of local administration. 

Moreover, both would need a constitution. If the Russian-authored one does see the light, different parts of the country would get the right to elect their governor, establish their own local parliaments, and have a share of their own natural resources, rather than have it funnelled directly to the central one in Damascus. This constitutional draft will be discussed at the forthcoming round of Geneva talks on May 15 and apparently, the Russians are adamant that it ought to see the light by the end of the year.

The draft agreement is co-signed by Russia, Iran and Turkey, referred in the legal texts as “guarantors” of the ceasefire, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. It calls for the creation of checkpoints that would guarantee the freedom of movement of unarmed civilians in all four territories, and the safe arrival of humanitarian aid, through the UN. The checkpoints would be jointly manned by the now not-so-armed opposition and the Syrian civilian authorities, under supervision of the guarantors.

The most interesting part of the agreement is that it calls for the deployment of “military units from the monitoring nations and other peacekeeping forces — something that Damascus has repeatedly refused since 2011. Putin has suggested “non-controversial” peacekeeping forces from Algeria, Egypt, the UAE and member states of Bricks (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The idea is to gradually de-escalate violence in the country, pocket-by-pocket; a “phased ceasefire” that was originally put forth by the Chinese three years ago.

“The most interesting part of the Syria agreement is that it calls for the deployment of ‘military units from the monitoring nations and other peacekeeping forces’.””Share on facebookTweet this

The devil is always in the details, though!

Although pleased that it would stop the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, the Syrian opposition is not very happy with the agreement because it actually re-creates and re-legitimises the Syrian government, treating them as equal partners in the reconciliation and part of the solution in Syria — as Putin has always wanted — rather than part of the problem — as Saudi Arabia and Turkey have constantly advocated.

Sami Moubayed is a senior fellow at St Andrews University in Scotland and author of Under the Black Flag (IB Tauris, 2015).

Source: http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-many-loopholes-of-a-syrian-ceasefire-deal-1.2022320