Mali's whisky-drinking rebel turned Islamist chief
In the course of an eventful life, Iyad Ag Ghali, head of the al Qaeda-linked Ansar Dine, has been a rebel, diplomat, negotiator and Islamist militant. In his latest avatar, he could also now determine the future of northern Mali.
On May 30, 2007, Iyad Ag Ghali, the current luxuriantly-bearded head
of Ansar Dine, an al Qaeda-linked militant group, walked into the US
embassy in the Malian capital of Bamako for a friendly chat with the
ambassador.
US diplomats at the meeting were clearly sympathetic to the man who
would go on to turn into the scourge of the breakaway region of northern
Mali.
“Soft-spoken and reserved, ag Ghali [sic] showed nothing of the
cold-blooded warrior persona created by the Malian press,” noted a
leaked US Embassy cable.
A fearsome Tuareg fighting man who, like many of his
brothers-in-arms, had fought for a motley mix of bosses and rebel
groups, Ag Ghali was attempting to negotiate yet another shotgun
ceasefire in the long history of conflict between the Malian government
and Tuareg rebels of various stripes and allegiances.
The cable noted that a “seemingly tired” Ag Ghali told the US
ambassador that then-Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure had accepted
Ag Ghali’s request for a diplomatic posting in Saudi Arabia. During his
“wide-ranging meeting”, Ag Ghali repeatedly requested US assistance for
“targeted special operations” against al Qaeda’s North African branch,
AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).
In this stretch of the Sahel - the remote region bridging the Sahara
and the African savannah where the borders of Mali, Algeria, Niger and
Mauritania meet - the fortunes of men seem to change with the shifting
sands.
Former, democratically-elected Malian President Toure - or ATT, as
he’s known - was ousted in a March 22 military coup and is currently in
exile in Senegal.
Ag Ghali, the man he once chose to diplomatically represent the
country, is now back home in northern Mali, a rebel commander who has
undiplomatically turned against the Malian state and seeking to
implement whatever is his vision of an Islamic emirate in a breakaway
region the size of France.
Five years after he pressed the US for targeted operations against
AQIM, Ag Ghali is currently linked with al Qaeda’s North African branch,
with regional and Western intelligence citing credible reports that
AQIM is currently fighting alongside Ansar Dine in northern Mali.
Along with a motley mix of rebel groups, Ag Ghali’s Islamist Ansar
Dine seized control of northern Mali in the chaos following ATT’s
ouster, sparking a perfect storm of crises in the region.
From war-maker to peace-dealer, from national representative to
rebel, from whisky-drinking Tuareg fighter to teetotaling jihadist, Ag
Ghali has had an eventful, contradictory life. At each step, and with
every twist and turn of his allegiances, he has succeeded in dragging
along the fortunes of his unfortunate people - whether they like it or
not.
The man in the middle
As the international community scrambles to respond to the current Malian situation, Ag Ghali is once again poised to position himself as a key player in whatever the outcome of the latest crisis brings.
As the international community scrambles to respond to the current Malian situation, Ag Ghali is once again poised to position himself as a key player in whatever the outcome of the latest crisis brings.
“He put
himself at the center of this rebellion, which is exactly what he
wanted,” says Andrew McGregor, senior editor of the Global Terrorism
Program at the US-based Jamestown Foundation. “He has become the important figure in northern Mali at the moment in determining its political future.”
From a fairly nondescript boyhood as the son of nomad cattle herders
to a regional kingpin - sometimes called "the lion of the desert - Ag
Ghali is a self-made man who has insolently tied his destiny with
history.
“Iyad is a very complex character,” says Jeremy Keenan, a
professorial research associate at the London-based School of Oriental
and African Studies. “He’s clever, a brilliant negotiator, he likes
being the boss and he’s a person who can never be trusted to keep his
word.”
A little over a year after Ag Ghali so impressed US diplomats, the US Embassy in Bamako appeared to have learned that lesson.
An October 2008 leaked US cable
questions whether Ag Ghali “is playing both sides”, and describes a man
far away from home, in the Malian consulate in Jeddah, constantly on
the phone, controlling the shots in the northern Mali.
“Ag Ghali continues to cast a shadow over northern Mali,” the cable
notes before adding, “Like the proverbial bad penny, ag Ghali [sic]
turns up whenever a cash transaction between a foreign government and
Kidal Tuaregs appears forthcoming.”
All in the family: abducting and releasing hostages
The cash transactions in question are ransom payments doled out by mostly European governments for the release of their citizens captured in the Sahel, an unpoliceable zone where smuggling and kidnappings are common income sources - and very profitable ones for Ag Ghali and his AQIM friends.
The cash transactions in question are ransom payments doled out by mostly European governments for the release of their citizens captured in the Sahel, an unpoliceable zone where smuggling and kidnappings are common income sources - and very profitable ones for Ag Ghali and his AQIM friends.
Most experts agree that Ag Ghali’s ties to AQIM have been intricately linked to the hostage business.
According to Keenan, Ag Ghali’s cousin, Abdel Krim operates under
senior AQIM leader, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, who heads one of the most
violent AQIM katibas
(or brigades) responsible for a spate of kidnappings over the past few
years, including those of Frenchman Pierre Camatte and British tourist
Edwin Dyer.
While his cousin has been part of AQIM’s kidnapping operations, Ag
Ghali for a while positioned himself as the hostage negotiator, a task
he fulfilled admirably. “He’s understood to make a lot of money for
this; he doesn’t do it for free,” notes McGregor.
Giving peace – and Islam – a chance
Born in the northern Malian town of Kidal into the elite, noble Iforas clan that claims sharif status - or ancestral links to the Prophet Muhammed - Ag Ghali’s exact age is not known. Experts believe he was born in the 1950s.
Born in the northern Malian town of Kidal into the elite, noble Iforas clan that claims sharif status - or ancestral links to the Prophet Muhammed - Ag Ghali’s exact age is not known. Experts believe he was born in the 1950s.
As a young man, Ag Ghali, like many Tuareg men his age, left northern Mali to serve as a mercenary for Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi.
Like many
militant leaders, Ag Ghali has created his own fighting narrative, much
of which is likely to be true. “During the 1980s in Gaddafi’s legions,
he was dispatched to fight in Chad and he now claims to have fought the
Israelis in southern Lebanon,” says Keenan.
In the early 1990s, he returned to Mali to take part in a Tuareg
rebellion as a rebel senior commander before he abandoned the fight to
help negotiate a peace deal with the government.
It was around this time that he encountered a handful of preachers from Tablighi Jamaat, a controversial Pakistan-based spiritual reformation movement, attempting to proselytize in the Sahel.
The fundamentalist preachers were having little success in a region
with a strong Sufi tradition and little patience for hardline Islam when
they landed in Kidal and encountered Ag Ghali.
His subsequent religious conversion is a matter of much debate within
his community, with some Tuaregs insisting it was an expedient move for
an ambitious Iforas leader to boost his religious credentials. Others,
however, say it could well have been a genuine religious awakening.
It was during his stint as consul general in the Saudi city of Jeddah
that Ag Ghali made the transition from pacifist fundamentalist to
hardline Islamist, a move that alarmed his hosts and resulted in his
expulsion from Saudi Arabia.
Two rejections and another rebellion
Back home in northern Mali, Ag Ghali helped negotiate an end to the 2007-2008 rebellion, which did not win him many friends among his Tuareg rebel colleagues, who accused him of abandoning his men by taking off for Saudi Arabia, then compromising their cause with the August 2008 Algerian-negotiated peace deal.
Back home in northern Mali, Ag Ghali helped negotiate an end to the 2007-2008 rebellion, which did not win him many friends among his Tuareg rebel colleagues, who accused him of abandoning his men by taking off for Saudi Arabia, then compromising their cause with the August 2008 Algerian-negotiated peace deal.
His poor standing was evident when he lost his leadership bid for the amenokal - or traditional chief - of his Kel Iforas clan last year.
Ag Ghali
suffered a second rejection after the 2011 Libyan uprising, when Tuareg
mercenaries returning home with arsenal looted from Gaddafi’s barracks
prepared to launch the latest uprising led by the secessionist MNLA.
“The MNLA was not interested in having him as their leader because he
had close ties with the Malian government and is basically viewed as a
collaborator,” says McGregor.
Undaunted by his failed MNLA leasdership bid, Ag Ghali formed his own
militant group, the Islamist Ansar Dine. “He was able to establish
Ansar Dine in a pretty short amount of time, which speaks for his
organizational skills and probably his charisma,” says McGergor.
According to McGregor, Ag Ghali’s reputation as a collaborator could
possibly explain the ruthlessness displayed by Ansar Dine fighters in
the current rebellion, which has been recorded in reports by groups such
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
Over the past few weeks, a tenuous alliance
between Ansar Dine and the secular Tuareg MNLA appears to be unraveling
as clashes between the two broke out last week in Ag Ghali’s hometown
of Kidal.
Cultivating an aura of mystique
Since northern Mali fell from government control following the March 22 coup, Ag Ghali appears to have maintained a low public profile.
Since northern Mali fell from government control following the March 22 coup, Ag Ghali appears to have maintained a low public profile.
There
have been a few sightings of him in some northern Malian cities such as
Timbuktu, where he gave a speech to reassure anxious residents shortly
after the city fell, according to witnesses.
But in sharp contrast to the MNLA’s well-oiled publicity machine, Ag
Ghali has been noticeable by his absence on the regional and
international airwaves.
“I’ve been monitoring the jihadist sites and what struck me was the
complete absence of communiqués from his movement or even messages of
supports by the jihadist community,” said McGregor. “It seems that even
the jihadist community seems unsure of him – it speaks for his mercurial
nature.”
According to Keenan, Ag Ghali’s recent reclusiveness only adds to his mystery.
“Unlike the MNLA, which has launched a propaganda war with spokesmen –
many of them based in Paris – putting out statements, Iyad doesn’t have
that facility,” says Keenan. “In many ways, it’s part of his strategy
not to play the media game. It’s an effective one because it adds to an
almost mystical air about him.”
But mystique alone does not make for military or political success.
“To be successful in northern Mali requires large-scale support,” says
McGregor. It’s not clear if Ag Ghali has that, but if his track record
is anything to go by, he will certainly try for that.
“Whatever he decides,” notes McGregor, “it will probably be the most important determining factor in northern Mali.”
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