Poverty of rhetoric and the fight against terrorism

Source: Momentng

THE strategy of combating Boko Haram begins with the hearts and minds of those at the grassroots and those susceptible to being influenced as a consequence of their lack of means. 

By Omoba Oladele Osinuga

THE strategy of combating Boko Haram begins with the hearts and minds of those at the grassroots and those susceptible to being influenced as a consequence of their lack of means. Indoctrination to extreme and fanatic views is implanted in the minds of such individuals. 

 

This is what independence and nationalist hero, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, (then Nigeria’s Federal Com- missioner of Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council) described at the Christ Church Cathedral, Lagos, on Sunday, February 8, 1970, in a speech titled: Economic Well- Being of the Individual as “like those of war, the seeds of peace must be sown and nurtured in the minds of men... 

 

There is an urgent and massive need for moral and spiritual reconstruction as well: the kind of reconstruction which will help to demolish morbid desire for naked power and domination; abuse and misuse of power and office; greed, selfishness, and intolerance; nepotism, favouratism, jobbery, bribery, and other forms of corruption; and erect, in their places, probity, tolerance, altruism and devotion; equality of treatment, justice, equity and fair play for all.”

 

Combating the threat of Boko Haram as a law enforcement and security issue requires going back to the basics. Intelligence gathering and analysis, community policing, operational and strategic approach to policing, vigilance and awareness by the public, renewed public publicity campaigns and a joint integrated approach of all the security agencies are measures that should be employed against the threats we face. 

 

On the other hand, in fighting turf wars and lawlessness through inter-agency skirmishes leading to loss of lives, including the family members and destruction of property between the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Army in Badagry (May 2011) and in Lagos (April 2006) severely weakens the fighting capabilities of security agencies in dealing with these challenges.

 

Experience from countries that have encountered so-called home-grown terrorism and counter-insurgency and have success- fully dealt with it and minimized the risks and levels of terrorist attacks have done so with boots on the ground – soldiers and elite forces patrolling in groups in the terrorists main areas of activities. 

 

Essentially, the combined operations of the army and police in the areas where Boko Haram operates will significantly limit and minimize their attacks and also help to restore normalcy in the lives of citizens living these areas. 

 

The BBC Journalist, John Simpson, commenting on the successes of experience of the British forces in Northern Ireland during the “troubles” period from ‘70s to ‘90s, when loyalists and Republican groups were very active in the United Kingdom, said that “packets” of soldiers on foot along the road, dominating it, thus preventing any groups of insurgents from gathering or getting near enough to set up ambushes. 

 

Two or three groups of a dozen or so highly trained and well-armed soldiers, patrolling on foot, pose a deadly threat to any guerrilla band. It should come as no surprise that where there is little or no investment in policing tools apprehension of terrorists is almost a next to impossible task. 

 

The visits of foreign law enforcement agents like the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), EUROPOL and the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL) or the visits of our law enforcement agencies to these organizations after terrorist attacks remain an exercise in futility. 

 

If you lack the basic crime detection tools in forensics, ballistics and database to compare evidence gathered from previous incidents, like DNA, fingerprinting, photographs of suspects, facial mapping and other material evidence from the crime scene but do not have the infrastructure to evaluate and assess the evidence you have collected, then you are doing invariably what is akin to looking for a pin in the middle of the Yankari game reserve.

 

The presumption of innocence is the foundation of police investigation. Through investigation, the police gather evidence with which to rebut the presumption in specific cases. However, the NPF lacks the infrastructure and skills for basic investigation. In 2006, the Presidential Committee on Police Reform reported that: “There is only one trained ballistician left in the Force and we were told he would soon go on retirement. 

 

There are no more fingerprint experts and the forensic laboratory has not taken off. Without the infrastructure and skills to support criminal investigations, the NPF is institutionally unable to respect the presumption of innocence or even maintain credible records.”  No successful action for fighting terrorism can be realized without the support of the public.

 

 Complementary to this is a public campaign by the government in creating an awareness of what terrorism is and what the public needs to report to the authorities. This would heighten the public’s vigilance to be on a state of alert and the need to report concerns to security agencies if they are suspicious on activities which may constitute terrorism. 

 

Furthermore, the dissemination of information should equally be used to deny known terrorists the oxygen of publicity. Terrorists in Nigeria use the media to publicize and glorify their barbaric acts to instill terror and fear in the minds of the public.

 

Concluded

 

Osinuga, a solicitor and advocate, Supreme Court of Nigeria, writes from Dagenham, Essex, United Kingdom.