OFTEN AT TOO HIGH A COST

Source: Telegraph

In a hostage situation, a nation needs a policy backed by law for practical, political and psychological reasons, writes Rajeev Kumar

Every time a high-profile abduction is carried out by insurgent groups to strike a deal with the administration, the entire nation is on tenterhooks. As television channels and newspapers report on government officials and abductors doing some hard bargaining, people all over the country are sucked into the hostage drama and the question in the minds of everyone is — will the government do enough to release those abducted? Once the abducted are released, the question is — did the government give in? These situations bring up some significant questions, which we as a society can no longer avoid.

The recent kidnapping of the district collector, R.V. Krishna, and the junior engineer, Pabitra Majhi, by Maoists in Orissa’s Malkangiri and the subsequent negotiations to secure their release comprise a case in point. These negotiations, in the absence of any clear-cut hostage negotiation policy, have become more matters of knee-jerk reactions than well thought out exercises.

During ‘successful’ negotiations, questions are raised about the price the State had to pay. Did the State ‘succumb’ to the insurgent groups’ demands? Will it encourage similar groups to repeat abduction more often? By agreeing to release a few insurgents, is the State not creating a bigger danger in the lives of innocent others? What about the lives of security personnel lost to capture insurgents?

For ‘unsuccessful’ negotiations, the State’s duty to ensure safety of the hostages would be pointed out. Would it not create panic if the State makes no effort to rescue them? And if hostages are government officials or security personnel, will failed negotiations not bring down the morale of the entire workforce?

Some of these questions are security-related, while others are related to ethics. It would be a grave mistake if we try to find answers to any of these from a narrow standpoint.

The first such high-profile hostage drama was that surrounding Rubia Saeed — the daughter of the home minister at the time — in 1989, when five militants were released to secure her safe return. This proved to be a watershed event in the history of the Kashmir insurgency.

Again, on December 24, 1999, IC 814 was hijacked and taken to Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. The hijackers initially demanded the release of 35 Islamic militants and $200 million in cash. Finally, three militants were released to ensure the freedom of about 200 Indian citizens. There were rumours of huge sums of money being paid too.

Of the three, Maulana Masood Azhar, the chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, came dangerously close to clinching another hostage situation when JeM militants stormed the Indian Parliament in 2001. The number of innocent lives lost to this group subsequently is far too many to make the Kandahar negotiations look like a bad deal in hindsight. The other released militant, Omar Sheikh, had not been less active than Masood Azhar. He is now serving a sentence in Pakistan for the kidnapping and murder of The Wall Street Journal journalist, Daniel Pearl. Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar continues to recruit and train young Kashmiris for terror attacks.

The 26/11 Mumbai attack was also designed to take as many hostages as possible. If important persons could be taken hostage as planned, the India government could be forced to negotiate so that safe passage would be granted to the attackers and many more jailed militants.

In recent years, Maoists too have adopted such tactics, targeting mostly security personnel or government officials. The abduction of the officer in charge of Sankrail police station in West Bengal, and of government officials in Orissa’s Malkangiri, posed tough challenges for the administration. Many may ask if there was a better option; however, few would offer a practical alternative.

Ask any counter-insurgency expert and his solution is elegantly simple: “No negotiation.” It’s not a conclusion experts have drawn through matter-of-fact policymaking, but by cost-benefit analysis. From the counter-insurgency point of view, any negotiation with abductors is detrimental as it makes adversaries stronger in terms of money, manpower and psychological advantage, and leads to the repetition of such incidents. So anyone taken hostage is considered ‘lost’.

On paper, at least, it appears to be the perfect policy. But why do we do the opposite when actually faced with such crises? The argument suddenly appears different when we move beyond theories and faces of hostages; their family members and friends stare at us. The principle of ‘sacrificing few’ for ‘saving many’ does not seem to hold good any more. Also, in an age when the media are constantly watching the government’s every move as a moral watchdog, the administration cannot afford to appear cold and calculating.

Moreover, pushing even a single life knowingly to certain death to attain a so-called larger objective cannot be deemed ‘ethical’. Hypothetically, consider if a proposal is placed before the US president to swap 10 US soldiers in exchange for Osama bin Laden. Any US president would know that the lives lost to track Bin Laden would cost the US army far more soldiers, but can anyone in his right mind send a few among his troops as lambs to the slaughter? Whatever be the cost, the honourable way would be to protect your men.

Is there a way out of this contradictory position? The answer, surprisingly, may be yes. We need not operate between the extremes of either ‘no negotiations’ or ‘no policy’. In fact, it is always advantageous to have a policy rather than have none at all. Once we have a policy backed by a legal framework, it would not be possible for any government to go beyond its purview. It would not only place limits on government negotiators but insurgent groups would also know the extent to which the government may be pushed.

There may be many variations of such a policy. It could be ‘no release of prisoners, but only negotiation on money’, or ‘only developmental demands’. These variants may be designed to work out a balance and may be designed to fit the need of the nation through exhaustive discussion.

Some may argue that insurgent groups could force governments to change their policy during crisis. But if the policy is legally backed, it may not be easy for the government to change it instantly, whatever the cost.

It is important to have a policy — even if not considered unanimously as the best possible — in place rather than having none at all. When operating under a ‘no negotiation policy’, if hostages are not recovered safely, citizens would at least ‘understand’. Also, negotiators would not be under pressure to appear ‘good’ in the public eye. Hostage situations have decreased dramatically in Israel since the country adopted a ‘no negotiations’ policy. Every country must find something suitable for itself to govern its actions during crises.

A no-policy situation simply adds to the crisis and puts our collective selves at greater risk. It is better to have an imperfect policy rather than none at all, if we want to stop being held at gunpoint every time one or more of our fellow citizens are taken hostage.