Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 16-10, 2020) - The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Main events of the past week

Routine attacks continued in ISIS’s various provinces in Syria, Iraq and throughout Africa and Asia. Noteworthy examples:
- Syria: Clashes continue between ISIS and the Syrian army and forces supporting it in the desert region in eastern Syria. Russian and Syrian fighter jets reportedly provided air support to Syrian forces. ISIS’s intensive activity in the Euphrates Valley continued, in the form of activating IEDs, shooting at vehicles, targeted killings, and attacking military positions).
- Iraq: ISIS’s intensive activity in northern and western Iraq continued, in the form of sniper fire, mortar shell fire, and attacking positions and compounds of the Iraqi security forces. Worth noting are the burning of two oil wells in the Kirkuk Province and the bombing of high-voltage lines and pylons supplying electricity to the city of Al-Qaim, as part of what ISIS calls the “ongoing economic war” against the Iraqi government.
- The Sinai Peninsula: ISIS’s activity in northern Sinai continued, in the form of activating IEDs, targeted killings, and sniper fire. This week, there were reports of another incident of a gas pipeline being blown up, about 30 km west of Al-Arish (in the same area where a pipeline was blown up on November 19, 2020).
- Somalia: ISIS released a video vehemently attacking Al-Qaeda and its affiliated Al-Shabaab movement. ISIS claims that it has given the Al-Shabaab operatives an extension of more than a year to join it but they have not assented and therefore it is fighting against them. The video shows executions of Al-Shabaab operatives and encourages ISIS operatives to continue the struggle against them.
- Afghanistan: ISIS fired 10 rockets, claiming that they were aimed at the military part of Kabul International Airport. According to the Afghan Interior Ministry, the rockets hit residential areas and killed a civilian.

The Syrian arena

The Idlib region

In the Idlib region, exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and the rebel organizations. They were focused on a region about 25-40 km south and southwest of Idlib. There were also reports of Russian airstrikes (Edlib Media Center, December 12, 2020).

ISIS’s activity in Syria^[1]

The region of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Mayadeen

Beheading of two people disguised as ISIS operatives

On December 14, 2020, two severed heads were placed in the public park in central Al-Basira, about 14 km north of Al-Mayadeen. They were the heads of two people who disguised themselves as ISIS operatives. A note was attached to them, reading “This is the fate of whoever robs in the name of the operatives of the [Islamic] State Organization (EuphratesPost Facebook page, December 14, 2020). The two people in question disguised themselves as ISIS operatives and demanded charity from residents. They were killed before dawn on December 15, 2020 (Khotwa, December 15, 2020). ISIS has not claimed responsibility. However, in the ITIC’s assessment, this was an act of intimidation, carried out by ISIS.

Further attacks

On December 13, 2020, ISIS operatives captured an SDF fighter about 20 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was interrogated and then executed.
On December 13, 2020, an SDF vehicle was targeted by machine gun fire in the Al-Jazzar open market, about 60 km northwest of Deir ez-Zor. Three fighters were killed and three others were wounded.
On December 12, 2020, an IED was activated against an SDF vehicle about 14 km north of Al-Mayadeen. The passengers were wounded.
On December 10, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked positions of pro-Iranian militias in the Al-Mayadeen Desert. About 10 fighters were killed or wounded (ALBADIA24 Twitter account, December 10, 2020). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for carrying out the attack. However, it was probably ISIS.
On December 9, 2020, two people affiliated with the Syrian regime and the SDF intelligence were targeted by machine gun fire about 4 km northeast of Al-Mayadeen. One of them was killed and the other was wounded.

The desert region (Al-Badia)

On December 14, 2020, ISIS operatives repelled a large Syrian army tank force that attempted to advance towards ISIS positions in the desert region (Al-Badia) east of Hama. A truck with Syrian soldiers caught fire. Three soldiers were killed and 10 were wounded. ISIS prevented the arrival of a rescue force. Only when Russian and/or Syrian airstrikes were carried out did the Syrian force retreat with the wounded and the bodies of the dead soldiers.
On December 13, 2020, Russian and Syrian fighter jets carried out airstrikes against positions (of ISIS) in the Al-Rasafah Desert (about 40 km southwest of Al-Raqqah). The airstrikes were reportedly part of a military campaign under Russian command in this area (ALABADIA24 Twitter account, December 13, 2020).
On December 13, 2020, an IED was activated against a Syrian army truck east of Hama. The passengers were killed or wounded.

Al-Hasakah region

On December 11, 2020, an “agent” of the International Coalition was targeted by machine gun fire about 80 km south of Al-Hasakah. He was killed.

Southern Syria

Daraa region

On December 10, 2020, a fighter of the forces supporting the Syrian army was targeted by machine gun fire in southern Daraa. He was killed.

SDF counterterrorism activities

On December 8, 2020, an SDF force killed a senior ISIS operative about 45 km south of Al-Mayadeen. The dead operative had been in charge of ISIS’s security committee in Deir ez-Zor while ISIS was controlling Al-Mayadeen. The International Coalition offered a reward to anyone who provides information leading to his apprehension (North Press Agency, a Syrian news website, December 8, 2020; Deir ez-Zor24 Twitter account, December 15, 2020).

ISIS operative killed by the SDF
(Deir ez-Zor24 Twitter account, December 15, 2020)

Escape attempt from the Al-Raqqah Main Prison thwarted

On the night of December 15, 2020, ISIS operatives tried to escape from the Al-Raqqah Main Prison, about 6 km northeast of the city of Al-Raqqah. The wardens opened fire at them. Two ISIS operatives were wounded. Most of the operatives held in that prison are Syrians (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, December 15, 2020).

The Iraqi arena

Provinces of Iraq (Wikipedia)

Summary of ISIS’s activity in the Iraqi arena

ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly released an infographic summarizing about four months of its activity in the Iraqi arena (from August 20 to December 10, 2020). The summary of activity was released on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Iraqi government’s announcement of victory over ISIS (see below). During this period, the province carried out 452 attacks, killing and wounding 794 people, including 39 commanders and officers in the Iraqi army and the militias supporting it. The main modus operandi was the activation of IEDs (158 incidents), followed by sniper fire (99); attacks (69); targeted killings (33); arson (12); ambushes (7); and others which were not specified (74) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020).

According to the infographic, the most active region of ISIS’s Iraq Province was the Diyala Province (north of Baghdad), where ISIS operatives carried out 146 attacks. It was followed by Kirkuk (79 attacks); Al-Anbar (55); Salah al-Din (49); north Baghdad, i.e., the southern part of the Salah al-Din Province (45); the Tigris (37); the south, i.e., Babel Province (25); Nineveh (8); and Fallujah, i.e., the eastern part of the Al-Anbar Province (8). Following is a breakdown of the casualties: Diyala (183); Kirkuk (167); Al-Anbar (137); north Baghdad (79); Salah al-Din (76); the Tigris (70); the South (59); Fallujah (18); and Nineveh (5).

ISIS attacks in the various provinces^{^[2]}

Salah al-Din Province

On December 14, 2020, an IED was activated against a Tribal Mobilization vehicle about 10 km north of Tikrit. One fighter was killed.

Diyala Province

On December 14, 2020, Popular Mobilization fighters were targeted by sniper fire about 40 km northeast of Baqubah. Two fighters were killed and two others were wounded.
On December 12, 2020, three mortar shells were fired at Tribal Mobilization forces about 80 km northeast of Baqubah. Four fighters were wounded.
On December 11, 2020, a Tribal Mobilization fighter was targeted by sniper fire about 80 km northeast of Baqubah. He was wounded.

Kirkuk Province

On December 13, 2020, two Iraqi policemen were targeted by sniper fire about 60 km southwest of Kirkuk. One policeman was killed and another was wounded.
On December 13, 2020, an Iraqi policeman was targeted by sniper fire on the Kirkuk-Baiji road. He was killed.
On December 10, 2020, an Iraqi army compound was targeted by machine gun fire about 4 km southwest of Kirkuk. One soldier was killed.
On December 9, 2020, an Iraqi army compound was targeted by sniper fire about 50 km west of Kirkuk. Two soldiers were killed.
On December 9, 2020, ISIS operatives activated IEDs which they had planted in two oil wells in the Khabbaz oilfield, about 30 km northwest of Kirkuk. The wells caught fire and damage was caused.

The two wells in the Khabbaz oilfield in flames (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020)

Al-Anbar Province

On December 9, 2020, ISIS operatives raided an Iraqi army compound northwest of Hit. Seven soldiers were killed and six others were wounded.

Power supply to Al-Qaim cut off

On December 6, 2020, the power supply to the city of Al-Qaim, near the Iraqi-Syrian border, was cut off when eight high-voltage pylons were blown up by IEDs (Akhbar al-Iraq, December 7, 2020). ISIS claimed responsibility. According to ISIS, its operatives activated IEDs against three high-voltage pylons, thus cutting off the power supply to the city. ISIS noted that this activity had been carried out as part of the “ongoing economic war” against the Iraqi government (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020).

Damaged high-voltage pylons which cut off the power supply to the city of Al-Qaim
(Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020)

It should be recalled that on November 24, 2020, ISIS operatives blew up several high-voltage pylons by IEDs about 60 km south of Mosul. The power line that was hit had served the army, the oil facilities and the water facilities located along it (Iraqi News Agency, November 24, 2020; the ITIC’s Spotlight on Global Jihad from November 25, 2020).

Nineveh Province

On December 11, 2020, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle about 30 km southeast of Mosul. One officer was killed and several soldiers were wounded.

Counterterrorism activities by the Iraqi security forces

Kirkuk Province

On December 13, 2020, teams of the Iraqi army Intelligence Directorate apprehended the woman in charge of ISIS’s Allowances in the Kirkuk Province after breaking into her house about 80 km southwest of Kirkuk (Al-Sumaria, December 13, 2020).
On December 12, 2020, Iraqi police teams captured a wanted ISIS operative who had worked in ISIS’s Information Office (Diwan al-I’lam). This media operative had disseminated information on ISIS’s attacks on social media. In addition, he took part in carrying out attacks against the Iraqi security forces. A portable memory storage device was found in his possession, which contained videos and reports on ISIS’s attacks (Al-Sumaria, December 12, 2020).
On December 12, 2020, Iraqi army intelligence teams seized a vehicle where IEDs and detonators for IEDs were hidden, about 80 km southwest of Kirkuk (Iraqi Defense Ministry Facebook page, December 12, 2020).

Al-Anbar Province

On December 12, 2020, Iraqi army intelligence teams located a 20-meter-long underground tunnel. They found 10 IEDs. Engineering teams destroyed the tunnel (Iraqi Defense Ministry Facebook page, December 12, 2020).

Nineveh Province

On December 12-13, 2020, forces of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Unit carried out a security operation against ISIS about 40 km southwest of Mosul. After two days of fighting, they forced the surviving ISIS operatives to return to tunnels and caves where they had been hiding. The unit personnel broke into the tunnels and threw hand grenades at the operatives. A total of 42 ISIS operatives were killed, including several high-ranking figures. In addition, weapons and equipment as well as local and foreign currency were found. The operation was carried out with Iraqi and Coalition air support (Iraqi Army Spokesman Yahya Rasoul’s Facebook page, December 13, 2020).

Right: The site of the operation against ISIS (Google Maps). Left: Fighters of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Unit during the operation (Facebook page of Iraqi Army Spokesman Yahya Rasoul, December 13, 2020)

On December 12, 2020, the Iraqi security forces located and destroyed a tunnel used by ISIS about 40 km south of Mosul (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 12, 2020).

The city of Baghdad

On December 13, 2020, Iraqi police teams apprehended two wanted ISIS operatives in a neighborhood in the southwestern part of Baghdad. The two had carried out executions inside Al-Jumhuriya Hospital in the Nineveh Province. In addition, they had taken part in activity against the Iraqi security forces and in driving Iraqi citizens from of their homes while ISIS controlled the Nineveh Province (Al-Sumaria, December 13, 2020).
On December 12, 2020, teams of the Baghdad Intelligence and Security Directorate apprehended a wanted ISIS operative while he was trying to move to a neighborhood southeast of central Baghdad (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 12, 2020).

The Sinai Peninsula

ISIS’s activity in northern Sinai^[3]

On December 13, 2020, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army bulldozer east of the Al-Zuhour military camp in Sheikh Zuweid. The bulldozer was destroyed.
On December 13, 2020, an Egyptian army “agent” captured by ISIS last week near the village of Rabi’a was executed by gunfire. ISIS released a video with “the agent’s confession,” also showing his execution. According to ISIS, the executed “agent” caused the killing of three ISIS operatives by the Egyptian security forces.
On December 11, 2020, in an attack against the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula (no specific place was mentioned), Major Mahmoud Rida of the Egyptian army air defense was killed (Shahed Sinaa – Al-Rasmia Facebook page, December 11, 2020). So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for killing him. However, it was probably ISIS.

Major Mahmoud Rida of the Egyptian army air defense
(Shahed Sinaa – al-Rasmia Facebook page, December 11, 2020)

On December 10, 2020, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army bulldozer north of Sheikh Zuweid. The bulldozer was put out of commission (Telegram, December 10, 2020).
On December 9, 2020, an Egyptian soldier was targeted by sniper fire south of Rafah. He was killed.

Another gas pipeline blown up west of Al-Arish

On December 10, 2020, a gas pipeline was reportedly blown up in the Sabikah area, about 30 km west of Al-Arish (Shahed Sinaa – Al-Rasmia Facebook page, December 10, 2020). This is the second recent bombing in this area (it should be recalled that on November 19, 2020, ISIS blew up a pipeline supplying gas to Al-Arish; according to an Egyptian source, only minor damage was caused by the explosion).

ISIS’s activity around the globe^{^[4]}

Summary of ISIS’s activity in the various Iraqi provinces (December 3-9, 2020)

ISIS released an infographic summarizing its activity on December 3-9, 2020. During this time, ISIS operatives carried out 62 attacks in the various provinces in Asia and Africa, compared to 48 attacks in the previous week. Most of the attacks were carried out in Iraq (32). Attacks were also carried out in ISIS’s other provinces: Syria (11); West Africa (7); Sinai Peninsula (7); Central Africa (3); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (1); and Somalia (1) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020).

Over 153 people were killed and wounded in those attacks, compared to 120 in the previous week. The largest number of casualties was in West Africa (60). The other casualties were in the following provinces: Iraq (50); Syria (20); Central Africa (18); Sinai Peninsula (3); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (5); and Somalia (1) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020).

Africa^{^[5]}

Nigeria

On December 13, 2020, ISIS operatives ambushed and fired machine guns at forces supporting the Nigerian army northwest of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. Three fighters were killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons, ammunition and vehicles were seized.
On December 12, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked a compound of the forces supporting the Nigerian army about 130 km south of Maiduguri. One fighter was killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons, ammunition and vehicles were seized. At the end of the attack, the compound was set on fire.
On December 12, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked a Nigerian army compound, about 50 km east of Maiduguri. Four soldiers were killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized. The compound was set on fire.
On December 12, 2020, ISIS operatives ambushed and fired machine guns at Nigerian soldiers north of Maiduguri. Six soldiers were killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons, ammunition and vehicles were seized.
On December 10, 2020, an IED was activated against a Nigerian army APC about 200 km north of Maiduguri. The passengers were killed or wounded.
On December 9, 2020, ISIS operatives set up a roadblock about 60 km west of Maiduguri. Two Christian civilians working for the Red Cross were taken prisoner.

Somalia

ISIS propaganda video calling for a struggle against the Al-Shabaab movement

On December 15, 2020, ISIS’s Somalia Province released a 56-minute video entitled Apology to Your God. In the video, ISIS attacks operatives of Islamic organizations, mainly Al-Qaeda, which it claims have deviated from the path of Islam. In the video, an ISIS operative in Somalia appears and states that ISIS in Somalia granted the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab operatives an extension of more than a year to join its ranks. According to the operative, some of them assented but their commanders refused and this led to fighting against them. The video goes on to show the executions of Al-Shabaab operatives who fought against ISIS. The video ends with words of encouragement to ISIS operatives to continue the fight against the Al-Shabaab movement (Telegram, December 15, 2020).

Title slide of the video released by ISIS’s Somalia Province, entitled Apology to Your God (Telegram, December 15, 2020)

Right: Operatives of ISIS’s Somalia Province attacking Al-Shabaab operatives. Right: Training of ISIS’s Somalia Province operatives (Telegram, December 15, 2020)

Mali

On December 13, 2020, ISIS operatives exchanged fire with Al-Qaeda operatives near the border between Mali and Burkina Faso. According to ISIS, 35 Al-Qaeda operatives were killed and others were wounded. In addition, motorcycles, weapons, ammunition and vehicles were seized.
On December 1, 2020, an Al-Qaeda operative was targeted by machine gun fire near the border between Mali and Burkina Faso. He was killed.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On December 8, 2020, a Congolese army compound was targeted by machine gun fire in the Beni region, in the northeast of the country (about 6 km west of the border with Uganda). Several soldiers were killed or wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.

Asia

Afghanistan

Rocket fire at Kabul

On December 12, 2020, a total of 10 rockets were fired that hit various areas in Kabul. According to the spokesman for the Afghan Interior Ministry, the rockets were fired from a car in the morning and hit residential areas. One civilian was killed and two others were wounded (Afghanistan Times, December 12, 2020).
ISIS claimed responsibility for the rocket fire. According to its claim of responsibility, it fired 10 Katyusha rockets [107 mm in diameter] at the military part of Kabul International Airport. According to ISIS, accurate hits of the target were observed (Telegram, December 12, 2020).

The rockets fired by ISIS (Telegram, December 12, 2020)

Additional attack by ISIS in Afghanistan^{^[6]}

On December 10, 2020, shots were fired at Malala Maiwand, a journalist affiliated with the Afghan regime in the city of Jalalabad. She was killed. It should be noted that ISIS has targeted male journalists in Afghanistan in the past, but attacks against female journalists are rare.

Russia: North Caucasus

On the morning of December 11, 2020, a small IED was activated near a building of the FSB (the Russian Federal Security Service) in a village located in the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia in Russia. In the afternoon, a man carried out a suicide bombing attack with a bomb that was strapped to his body, against security personnel operating in the arena. As a result, six security personnel were wounded (Russia Today, December 11, 2020). To date, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack. It can be assumed that it was carried out by ISIS or by another Islamic-jihadist element.

The village in the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia where the attack was carried out
(Google Maps)

The battle for hearts and minds

This week, the main article in ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly was dedicated to the third anniversary of the Iraqi government’s declaration of victory over ISIS. The article ridicules the Iraqi government, which continues to claim victory over the organization in its media outlets, while in practice it continues to suffer heavy losses (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 10, 2020). Following are the highlights of the article:
- A few weeks after the declaration of victory over ISIS, the Iraqi regime began to admit that there were “sleeper cells” and “terrorist dens” in Iraq. Today, the regime describes the situation in Iraq as similar to the situation on the eve of ISIS’s takeover of Iraqi cities in June 2014. Iraqi government officials even admit that “the victory [over ISIS] was not complete.”
- The Iraqi regime does not even have accurate statistics on the number of incidents carried out by ISIS, in light of their large number. According to the article, the Iraqi regime is concerned about the reduction in US forces in Iraq. Its people fear for their lives, since US planes will no longer be able to save them.
- In fact, ISIS’s activity is not declining in Iraq, but recently there has been an increase in the intensity of ISIS’s activity in the region: ISIS is expanding its activity in much of its territory, targeting senior Iraqi military officials and even harming the Iraqi economy through attacks on oil facilities and electricity infrastructure.
- The author ends the article by praising ISIS operatives in Iraq. He states that the only thing that has changed since the Iraqi government’s declaration of victory over ISIS is that the Iraqi government is now certain that the situation is going to change for the worse, and as far as that is concerned, only time will tell.

The fate of the children of ISIS operatives in detention camps in Syria and Iraq

In her latest article, researcher Vera Mironova analyzes the issue of children of ISIS operatives in detention camps in Syria and Iraq and examines ways for dealing with it. She presents the children as ISIS’s most vulnerable victims, who are liable to join ISIS in the future, and recommends how to deal with the challenge. The article appears in light of the process that has been taking place in recent months, whose purpose is to release the families of ISIS operatives from the detention camps in Syria and Iraq^{^[7]}.

The problem of ISIS children: background and implications

In October 2020, a 16-year-old boy in Russia was fatally shot after he wounded a policeman while trying to set several police cars on fire. It wasn’t his family’s first brush with the law. In 2001, his stepfather was convicted to 14 years in prison for terrorism after he attempted to explode a gas pipeline, likely as part of an Islamist organization. The incident added new urgency to the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of children of ISIS operatives still in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria (with an emphasis on the Al-Hol camp). The author notes that almost everyone involved in issues related to the repatriation of these incarcerated children is taking advantage of the issue of the children to advance their own agendas.

Attempts by mothers to repatriate their children for a ransom

In October, several Western governments, including Sweden and Germany, sent delegations to camps in Syria to speak to incarcerated female nationals about whether they wanted to repatriate their children. None of the women they spoke to agreed. On their social media accounts and in Telegram channels, many of them said that they made their decisions for their children’s own well-being—the kids needed to be close to their mothers. But in private, they added their concern that allowing the children to be repatriated meant their government would forget about the mothers themselves and leave them in the camps.

Three examples of problems that have arisen regarding the repatriation of the children

Examples 1:
- The official policy of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which oversee many of the detention camps where wives and children of ISIS fighters are incarcerated, is that only orphans and medical cases (sick children with their mothers) are eligible to be sent home. Mothers admit to trying to pass their children off as orphans, and women have used orphans to blackmail grandparents back home, saying that if the grandparents would pay a ransom, their grandchild could be repatriated.
- One case that several women in the camp mentioned involved a 56-year-old Chechen Islamic State affiliate known as Kadidja jailed in the Al-Hol camp. For several months, she hid four Russian orphans so they would not be sent back home. Publicly, she said she did not want the children to grow up in a non-Muslim country with grandparents she considers non-Muslim. At the same time, however, she is reported to have told each orphan’s relatives she would return the children if they will pay for her to be smuggled to Turkey. She let the children go after ISIS operatives asked her to do so and ISIS supporters abroad threatened to stop sending her money that they had been giving her for their care. According to other family members and camp officials, that case was not unique.
Example 2:
- In one case in Central Asia, a mother repatriated with her child falsely claimed that the child’s father was a man from a wealthy family who had died in Syria. The country’s intelligence service knew she was lying; the man was fighting in a different area nine months before the child was born.
Example 3:
- One woman said that the women were warned that if they try to repatriate their children through illegal means, their children would be taken to orphanages in Syria instead. For the Syrian Democratic Forces, having control of many foreigners, and children in particular, in camps would potentially give them a stronger position in in the negotiations with women’s home governments.

Preventing the growth of a new generation of ISIS fighters

What to do with the children of Islamic State fighters is a crucial question not only from a humanitarian perspective but also from a security point of view. In countries with a long history of an insurgency, cases of children joining their fathers in combat are not rare. Therefore, while a majority of countries are still trying to keep children with their radicalized parents in war zones outside the country, some countries do the opposite, and place them in orphanages (for example, in Tajikistan, ISIS-affiliated children repatriated from Iraq and Syria are placed in orphanages).

According to the author, these children are already at risk of becoming the new face of the Islamic State or whatever group follows, and the more the world abandons them, the more likely they are to feel they have no other option. The author ends by stating that the key to solving the problem is repatriation, with careful attention on the part of the local authorities. This attention finds expression in a process of de-radicalization of the returnees and their reintegration into local society.

^[1] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[2] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^{[3] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram} ↑
[4] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[5] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[6] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[7] Vera Mironova, What to do about the Children of the Islamic State. The terrorist group's most vulnerable victims are also its future face. Foreign Policy, 25 November 2020:https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/25/islamic-state-isis-repatriation-child-victims/The author is a visiting research fellow at Harvard University. She also serves as a policy advisor on the armed forces (implicitly, of the United States). She also served as a reporter, accompanying the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) when they retook the city of Mosul from ISIS during 2016-2017. In addition to visits to Iraq and to ISIS children’s camps in Syria, she has also visited other conflict zones around the globe. Her award-winning first book, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups (Oxford University Press) was published in 2019. The author also visited the Al-Hol camp, interviewed women, and wrote an article about it. ↑

Source: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-global-jihad-december-16-10-2020/