Why has the PKK taken action?
The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) announced that five terrorists were killed and a number of soldiers were wounded in a clash that occurred in Ağrı. Then, the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) camps argued that it was a setup devised by the ruling party, which they say sought to have soldiers killed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The ruling party responded with a harsh and security-oriented rhetoric, depicting these statements as "provocation" and "threats to the security of the election." What is happening as the election nears? Why has the PKK taken action?
As a matter of fact, the PKK hasn't changed its attitude; rather, what has changed is the ruling party's attitude. With the effective crackdown in 2012, a serious blow to the PKK was dealt, as the PKK's camps in the region were destroyed. If the ruling party had improved the fundamental and democratic rights of Kurds in parallel to the effective combat against the PKK, the organization's clout in the region would have gradually diminished. With the slackening of the PKK's pressures on them, local people started to act more freely and the state was able to conduct effective and coordinated operations against the organization for the first time. But then, everyone started to talk about moonlight and roses, referring to a settlement process.
Along with a number of experts who closely monitor the developments in the region, I stressed that the sanguine portrayal of the situation might be misleading and that everyone should exercise caution. But we were severely lambasted for being "bloodthirsty" and "loving flesh and gore." Yet our position was that the process should be carried out in an open and transparent manner and by taking into consideration potential adversities.
But at that time, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was pumping the propaganda, "Let no one die and let no mother cry." Although it didn't prepare the infrastructure and it failed to fulfill the requisites, the ruling party was claiming that it would settle the country's greatest problem, and it sought to attract popular support with this propaganda. The artificially created atmosphere was so rosy that people started to blindly believe that the Kurdish issue was being solved. Actually, no soldier was martyred in the process.
But people turned a blind eye to the fact that the PKK was promoted to the status of official representative of all Kurds. It was legitimized and acted as a leader for all Kurds. However, Kurdish people weren't taken as addressees, no legal reforms were made to improve their fundamental rights and freedoms and there was no effort to up the democracy ante.
Contrary to suggestions, the PKK didn't lay down arms and it didn't become inactive. Rather, its strength reached a peak compared to the past. PKK leaders admitted that this became possible thanks to the settlement process. The number of the organization's new recruits skyrocketed. Even fledgling youths were ceremoniously taken to the mountains.
PKK reinforces presence in Kandil Mountains
In this period:
1. The PKK reinforced its presence in the Kandil mountains in northern Iraq; it acquired heavy weapons, anti-aircraft guns and missiles.
2. It established new camps in Turkey and started to train militants. This made it possible for the PKK to exert pressure on the Kurds living in urban areas.
3. The KCK formed armed militias in the cities. More than 20,000 automatic rifles were distributed, and the region was taken under control in a pervasive, organized fashion.
4. The PKK strengthened its de facto presence in Syria and Iraq, establishing cantons.
5. The PKK and its offshoots carved out international legitimacy for themselves under the pretext of combating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), secured heavy weapons from the international community and became like an army and a state. Today, Turkey's southern borders, particularly the Syrian border, are practically borders of the PKK.
2. It established new camps in Turkey and started to train militants. This made it possible for the PKK to exert pressure on the Kurds living in urban areas.
3. The KCK formed armed militias in the cities. More than 20,000 automatic rifles were distributed, and the region was taken under control in a pervasive, organized fashion.
4. The PKK strengthened its de facto presence in Syria and Iraq, establishing cantons.
5. The PKK and its offshoots carved out international legitimacy for themselves under the pretext of combating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), secured heavy weapons from the international community and became like an army and a state. Today, Turkey's southern borders, particularly the Syrian border, are practically borders of the PKK.
Turkey's ruling party was winning votes with tactical moves while the PKK made strategic achievements, strengthening its position inside and outside. Abdullah Öcalan -- the PKK leader serving a life sentence at a prison on İmralı Island off the coast of İstanbul -- was marketed as "man of peace" and an "assurance of democracy."
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to stick to his opportunist policies. The process, which has so far been carried out in a way that plays into the hands of the PKK, is coming to an end. Kurds have lost because they failed to secure any democratic rights. Turkey has lost because the PKK's firepower has skyrocketed. The winner in the settlement process is the PKK. Having realized that the current state of affairs won't be translated into votes for the ruling AKP, Erdoğan made a sharp turn, saying, "There is no Kurdish issue."
Process in favor of the PKK
Turkey was not pleased that the process had worked to the advantage of the PKK. A full-fledged state was being established in the region. Alarm bells were ringing for the AKP. Although it sought to earn them with a pragmatic attitude, the AKP was bleeding votes to the HDP. Erdoğan was quick to notice this change and he promptly changed course and started to hunt for nationalist votes.
During the period when he sought to become the "hero of the solution," he prevented security forces from conducting operations and even kept the police and the army away from incidents threatening public order. Thus, security units were hamstrung while the PKK and its armed units enjoyed impunity and freedom. The PKK was free to racketeer, try people, abduct people and attack military outposts. There were clashes as well. But at that time, these breaches were ignored to keep the process going, and a different picture was offered to the general public.
The situation didn't change in the region, even after Erdoğan and the AKP started to hunt for nationalist votes; only the ruling party's discourse and attitude changed. Interventions with militants and camps came. I believe more clashes will follow. This is because clashes and insecurity are needed to galvanize people's concerns and compel them to vote for the ruling party for the sake of stability. All sorts of schemes may be employed with the AKP's alliance with shady forces to make this happen.
The PKK will certainly be the most effective tool. I wouldn't be surprised if PKK leaders from Kandil produced provocative statements to push voters toward the AKP. During the settlement process, the deal was between Öcalan and the AKP, while the PKK leaders in Kandil were cautious. The HDP was like an intermediary or a figurehead. Given Öcalan's statement of support for Erdoğan's presidency and the close ties between the PKK/KCK and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), Öcalan or Kandil may be a partner in the latest campaign. These actors would prefer the AKP's presidential system, as this may make their dreams of a federation and amnesty for Öcalan come true.
I am not sure if the PKK will approve of the HDP's passing the election threshold and getting more involved in Turkish politics. Indeed, the normalization of pro-Kurdish policies will undermine the PKK's popularity. The PKK will certainly favor its own emergence as the sole representative of Kurds so that it can establish a de facto administration in the region.
The PKK's increased activism may help the AKP attract nationalist voters, but it won't hurt the HDP. Due to the ruling party's unreliable practices and increased pro-Kurdish sentiments, the HDP is able to boost its votes and it can now attract religious Kurds as well. Therefore, the PKK's increased activities in the region and the harsh rhetoric from the ruling party seek to manipulate nationalist, not pro-Kurdish, voters. I hope the TSK won't allow itself to be used a tool in these election games.
Indeed, those election-centric and populist policies have made the Kurdish issue and the terrorism problem gangrenous. What the ruling party is currently doing is to postpone these problems and boost its votes in the process. Many problems can be tolerated and solved, but Machiavellian approaches to the Kurdish issue and terrorism can lead to irreparable damage.
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