The PKK: An obsolete organization

The secularist nation-building experiment, along with Turkish modernization and government practices, resulted in unbelievable grievances, bloodshed and tears. At the same time, these negative experiences exerted a major influence on the development, maturation and sophistication of various political movements across the political spectrum. During this period, both those right-leaning and leftists have received their fair share of Kemalist ideology. Unfortunately, only a handful of political movements have been able to break the cycle of indoctrination - the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) representing one such exception.

There are a number of methods to establish whether a given movement has broken free from the past century's vicious cycle, but one can achieve the same result with a simple question: how different are your actions today than last century's? Alternatively, how is your political, social and organizational standing different from that of your origins? Directing these questions at the PKK, one discovers a particularly troubling situation.

In its earliest years, the movement consciously turned to violent means in order to pursue its own utopia. In this regard, its members knew full well what the costs of such a decision might be. Regardless of all the leftist justifications of these downsides, the PKK were certain about the outcome of bloodshed. They also knew that resorting to violence would put them in touch with various power holders and, consequently, justify their organization. While some of these power holders were active at the regional and even global level, others operated inside the country. The guardianship regime, for instance, enjoyed the luxury of putting off the nation's democratization efforts for two decades citing PKK violence.

Now let us turn back to the original question: To what extent is the PKK capable of operating outside the political tradition it began three decades ago? Does the organization have a political vision beyond the violent scenes of Oct. 6-7, 2014? Where does the movement, which was preoccupied with cracking down on competing Kurdish groups and scoring points by fighting the Armed Forces 30 years ago, stand today?

Perhaps it would be sufficient to see where the PKK has been standing since 2013, when the peace process began? Three decades ago, the organization had the opportunity to exploit the guardianship regime's methods and society's ideological responses to the nation-state in order to carve out a domain of legitimacy. By 2014, however, the nation's democratic transformation and the Kurdish question's complete reinvention have created a new agenda.

Considering that all actors, social and political structures, and the entire ecosystem has changed, is the PKK capable of becoming anything but a terrorist organization? Over the years, the guardianship regime's self-proclaimed and admittedly unrealistic strategy of distinguishing between ordinary citizens and terrorists not only failed to mobilize public support but also actively contributed to the PKK's popularity. Surely enough, the PKK's commitment to simultaneously launch violent attacks and remain active in democratic politics is at least as contradictory as the guardianship regime's past plans to wipe out terrorists while denying the Kurdish identity. In the wake of the Kurdish peace process, therefore, the organization has begun to resemble its original form.

If the PKK's obsession with its point of departure persists, the main challenge will be not to complete the peace process but to facilitate the rationalization of the PKK/HDP tradition. Undoubtedly, this situation will not worry those who are "stuck in the mountains" politically or strategically. This is, however, a serious issue for a political party with several million supporters as well as for the many people who live in the region yet do not share the group's ideology. No matter how we look at the situation, any party whose politics remain firmly rooted in the year 1984 is simply not a viable contributor to future debate. Provided that the PKK does not change its ways, we will witness the rise of competing Kurdish politicians and an increase in violent action. Ultimately, the organization will have no choice but to engage in a comprehensive internal review. Until then, however, the group can only remain relevant by rationally participating in the reconciliation process. Any action to the contrary will reveal the PKK as the source of the problem while the nation permanently resolves the Kurdish question.

Source http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/taha-ozhan/2015/01/02/the-pkk-an-obsolete-organization