Rhetoric and reality

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By M K Bhadrakumar

The US wish list includes the nuclear liability bill, the education bill and the easing of caps on investment in critical sectors.

The United States-India relationship seems set to fly high into a clear blue sky where the sun eternally shines. The rhetoric emanating from Washington would have us all but imagine the US believes it has no future in the 21st century without India’s partnership. The rhetoric was meant to calm Delhi’s nerves regarding President Barack Obama’s perceived lack of commitment to the US-India partnership. Instead it resuscitates moribund Bush-era doctrines. But we live in a real world. And external affairs minister S M Krishna kept his dignified poise with feet firmly on the ground while co-chairing the inaugural US–India Strategic Dialogue in Washington. The dialogue did not produce ‘deliverables’ for New Delhi. Nor was it expected. True, access to David Headley happened, but only after an uncharacteristic public airing of the demand by Krishna with Hillary Clinton listening. It still remains unclear whether this is a one-off affair or how Indian interrogators would possibly pierce Hedley’s armour of immunity under the plea bargain.  The heart of the matter is that the Obama administration cannot afford to annoy Pakistan. The dialogue in Washington last week doesn’t change this geopolitical reality. Senior US officials took manifest care to portray Pakistan as a victim rather than as a perpetrator of terrorism in the region. Equally, they underscored the centrality of Islamabad’s cooperation in the Afghan settlement. Clinton liberally commended India’s development assistance for Afghanistan but wouldn’t contemplate an expansion of Delhi’s role to include ‘capacity-building’ for Afghan security forces, which remains the crucial challenge. The short point is, Pakistani army chief Pervez Kiyani has drawn a red line in regard of India’s profile in Afghanistan and if the Americans breach it, there will be consequences to face. Krishna did voice the known Indian apprehensions regarding “a segmented approach to terrorism, especially in our (India’s) neighbourhood” and claimed the dialogue “further increased our understanding on the nature and source of terrorism” but Clinton neatly sidestepped these minefields. The joint statement called for “swift and credible steps to eliminate terrorist safe havens and vowed to strengthen global consensus and legal regimes against terrorism.” So, why such a rhetorical hype? Three main reasons can be ascribed. Having India on its side becomes a tactical need in tackling certain key challenges today such as climate change, Iran, Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, whereas, recent trends in Indian policies cause disquiet in Washington. The India-China cooperation at the Copenhagen summit on climate change checkmated the western strategy and a nexus between the two Asian giants puts the US at disadvantage. Coercive diplomacy Delhi is increasingly taking an independent line on Iran and welcomed the Turkey-Brazil-Iran swap deal, which undermined the US’ coercive diplomacy. The endgame in Afghanistan is critically dependent on Pakistan’s cooperation, which in turn is linked to India-Pakistan tensions and the US’ capacity to moderate the rivalry. With regard to the nuclear deal, the US side repeatedly stressed that the deal “brought important commitments to global non-proliferation goals,” whereas, Krishna insisted modestly that the deal opened the door for business for the American firms. The US officials implicitly linked the nuclear deal with the Indian stance on Iran. Secondly, the US is mounting a robust export drive to crank up its economy and the Indian market offers huge potential for military sales and nuclear commerce. The prospects have brightened for the US to do away with the residual restrictions on transfer of sensitive technology to India. Washington senses that the Manmohan Singh era in the Indian policymaking will not last forever. However, as undersecretary of state William Burns put it, “Realising the full potential of our partnership in the years ahead will require some important choices. It also means developing complementary policies and habits of cooperation.” The US wish-list includes the nuclear liability bill (‘consistent with international standards’), Kapil Sibal’s education bill, logistics support agreement giving the US military access to Indian military bases and “more rapid Indian consideration of reforms, including the easing of caps on investment in critical sectors.” It is a tough call for Manmohan Singh to fulfil. There is unmistakably an international context when the US seeks out India as a partner to ‘work together in Asia’ and ‘build a new global commons — an international system in which other democracies can flourish…’ The plain truth is that new tensions have come to the fore in US-China relationship. A distinct frostiness has appeared in the air between the two capitals which until recently were perceived to be advancing toward a ‘G2’ condominium. The Asia-Pacific security remains fluid. The impasse over the sinking of the Cheonan highlights that Beijing sees its interests differently than Japan and South Korea. By a curious coincidence, Krishna’s next port of call happens to be Seoul. However, given the dynamics of US-China interdependency and the inevitability of China’s rise, Delhi needs to carefully weigh how far its long-term interests can be dovetailed with Washington’s efforts to gain tactical advantages vis-à-vis Beijing. But then, as Burns admitted, Americans too have their angst about India — “that India doesn’t always see as clearly as others do how vital its role in Asia is becoming. Some Americans worry that India is ambivalent about its own rise in the world.” (The writer is a former diplomat)