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Source:Nazret
By Ture Hirbe
For many months and weeks now the debate is going on over non-violent versus armed struggle. Both arguments have weak and strong points, merits and demerits. But my take is different from both. I am of the opinion that in Ethiopia both forms of struggle have not been effectively tested yet. As to my knowledge those opposition groups who opted for non-violent struggle are operating under the boundary that the government allotted to them. There are rules to observe and pre-set criteria to pass in order to become opposition and operate in Ethiopia. The opposition forces are obeying these rules, the rules that keep them under the tight control of the regime. Thus, the opposition forces are not engaged in non-violent struggle, instead they are “Loyal Opposition”. As to those engaged in armed struggle, with the exception of ONLF, have never seriously posed any threat to the regime.
It is true that nonviolent resistance is a set of tactics that can be used by weak groups to challenge the status quo without employing violence. But as Gandhi described: “Nonviolence does not mean a meek submission to the will of the evildoer, but it means putting one’s whole soul against the will of the tyrant.” The opposition forces in Ethiopian cannot even call public meeting if the regime does not allow them to do so. We don’t call this a non-violent resistance; rather it is a total submission to the will of the tyrant. Needless to say that the non-violent resistance requires great bravery and sacrifices, even more than the violent resistance, because the authorities may respond with violence, and because the protesters remain nonviolent in the face of violent response from the adversary.
Sharp (1970) has distinguished three classes of Nonviolent Resistance:
1. Nonviolent resistance which includes: marches, haunting officials, distributing protest literature, etc., and this kind of tactics produces an awareness of the existence of dissent.
2. Nonviolent noncooperation: such as “economic boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, etc., which present the opponents with difficulties in maintaining the normal efficiency and operation of the system; and
3. Nonviolent intervention including: “sit-ins, fasts, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent invasion, and parallel government,” which actively harass the adversary.
The last two nonviolent tactics are very effective tactics for current Ethiopian situation and are never being tested. The “sit-in” protest called by the opposition after the rigged election of 2005 was thwarted by a foreign diplomat with the help of two opposition leaders. Had that sit-in protest were not called off, it would have tested Meles’ Regime. It was one of the gravest tactical mistakes of the opposition after the election. Meles as a Machiavellian survivalist had sensed the danger in time and appealed for the intervention of a foreign friend, who shamelessly meddled in the internal affairs of Ethiopia, and helped him save the day. As a result he recaptured the momentum from the opposition, and since then he is actively engaged in counter attack.
Such tactics and others listed above should be vigorously pursued despite sacrifices if the nonviolent resistance is chosen as a form of a struggle. Short of these tactics the opposition should not consider itself as engaged in a nonviolent struggle.
Right now the International conditions are not favorable for those movements engaged in armed struggle. The threat of international terrorism and the international coalition against it do not favor liberation movements. Besides, in case of Ethiopia most of the neighboring countries are in the pocket of Meles with the exception of Eritrea. Asmara will never help any group to victory, because it will be against its own interest. They are only using the opposition as an instrument to weaken Meles and bringing him to the negotiating table in their terms. Under current situation the Guerilla warfare and conventional war will not produce an immediate result in toppling the regime.
However, those engaged in armed struggle could have tried other strategies and could have tested the regime. For example, “Armed Insurrection” is another form of armed struggle if guerilla warfare and direct confrontation (conventional war) do not work. Armed insurrection will be more effective because it involves the population at large. But it demands an intensive political and organizational work. It is difficult to mobilize the mass from Asmara, Europe, or US Capitals. Leaders and cadres should be among the people working underground, mobilizing, organizing and arming them for self-defense against state violence.
Thus, I think, both form of struggles failed to achieve their objectives not because they are ineffective, but because they are not seriously tested. My argument is that both forms of struggle could have produced, and will produce a desired result if properly and effectively handled.

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