Morocco’s Multi-Pronged Counterterrorism Strategy Matthew Chebatoris

This May marks the sixth anniversary of the deadly night of suicide bombings in Casablanca. The attacks, characterized by many as Morocco’s 9/11, took the lives of 33 innocent victims, while the attackers, hailing from the slums of Sidi Moumen, lost 12 of their own.  Since that dark night, Moroccans have been led by King Mohammad VI on a path to cleanse the kingdom of the scourge of violent extremism.  In pursuit of this goal, Morocco has embarked on a multi-pronged strategy to combat terrorism and thwart the efforts of the Algerian-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to widen the theater of regional jihad in North Africa.  The strategy is comprehensive in nature and sets out multiple objectives which illuminate Morocco’s position as a beacon of hope in the often tumultuous North African political environment.

Judicial Actions

Morocco’s judiciary remains a key player in the country’s counterterrorism arsenal and routinely coordinates its efforts with counterparts abroad.  This is particularly true in cases involving the ongoing prosecution of individuals suspected of having ties to the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the attacks on Madrid’s transportation system the following year.  The Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain - GICM), suspected by some to have played a role in one or both of the attacks, may be defunct, but the group’s legacy lives on in the courts.  In early March, an appeals court in Sale sentenced GICM member Hassan al-Haski to ten years in prison for his involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings.  He was charged with “forming a criminal gang to prepare and commit terror attacks aimed at seriously undermining the public order by means of terror and violence” (Maghreb Arab Presse, March 2). Hassan is one of three al-Haski brothers, all of whom have been affiliated with transnational terrorism.  He was captured by Spanish authorities in the Canary Islands in 2004 after leading authorities on a month-long manhunt in the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings (Lukor.com [Granada], December, 2004).

An arrangement between Moroccan and Spanish authorities allowed Hassan al-Haski to be temporarily transferred to Morocco to stand trial.  He has now been returned to Spanish custody to continue serving a 14-year sentence for his involvement in the Madrid attacks (Assabah, February 26; AFP, April 3).  One week earlier the Moroccan court sentenced Saad al-Husseini, an alleged “key plotter” in the Casablanca attacks, to 15 years in prison.  In a related move, the court also handed out sentences ranging from three to eight years imprisonment to 17 of his co-conspirators (Maghreb Arab Presse, March 2).  In addition to prosecuting individuals involved in the 2003 Casablanca attacks, the terrorist tribunal in Sale recently convicted 29 individuals for belonging to a terrorist organization.  The prosecution stated the men were members of AQIM and to varying degrees had been active in planning terror attacks, inciting violence and holding unauthorized meetings (AFP, April 17).

While the prosecution of terror suspects has grabbed headlines, Morocco’s judiciary has also been extending a carrot to detained Salafi-Jihadi detainees.  The Moroccan Human Rights Dignity Forum Association recently invited Saudi and Egyptian clerics to speak at an international conference on April 24th.  The selected clerics were previously involved in leading spiritual efforts to rehabilitate jailed Islamists (Assabah, April 20). It is not clear which specific cases they have been involved in and the Saudi program has suffered some significant setbacks (see Terrorism Monitor, April 10).  Egypt, however, has had notable successes in rehabilitating former Islamic Group (IG) members, including the high profile recantation of militancy by former Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Zawahiri associate Sayyid Imam (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl)  (see Terrorism Monitor, December 10, 2007; Terrorism Focus, April 30, 2008). It is too early to tell if we can expect similar “confessions” to arise from Moroccan prisons.  Rehabilitation programs, Islamist or otherwise, are never a silver bullet and are often most effective with those who are not yet fully committed to their cause.  Nonetheless, the inclusion of Saudi and Egyptian representatives in the early stages of developing a prison-based rehabilitation program for jailed Islamists is a sign that Moroccan authorities are taking the initiative seriously and hoping to replicate and perhaps build upon the past successes of similar programs abroad.

Advanced Military Training

The threat from AQIM has been largely rhetorical, inasmuch as available information does not suggest there have been any substantive AQIM-led plots inside Morocco.  On the other hand, an increase in military training and regional cooperation has undoubtedly played a hand in maintaining a secure environment.  Three specialized units have recently been established in the Moroccan Army.  The units were formed to focus on illegal immigration, terrorism and drug smuggling – three interwoven plagues currently confronting Morocco.  The staffing for each unit reportedly calls for 140 soldiers and 13 officers, led by a colonel.  American and French forces have provided specialized training to the units (Assabah, March 12).  The initiative appears to be a step towards diversifying the ranks of the Moroccan Armed Forces by adding advanced training and creating elite units capable of combating the threats facing the kingdom after making the transition to an all volunteer force in 2006 (see Terrorism Monitor, February 21, 2007).

Separately, the Moroccan military conducted a large scale combined arms exercise this April near Oum Driga.  The maneuvers involved over 2,000 troops operating both on the ground and in the air and were designed in part to test the interoperability of the services and their newly acquired U.S. and European weapons systems (Assabah, April 9).  Although it remains unstated, a possible objective of the exercise may have been a show of force aimed at Algeria in the wake of recent protests by the Algerian-based Polisario and its perennial effort to draw attention to its demands for an independent Western Sahara.  In addition to the newly acquired Western military equipment, Morocco is rumored to be in negotiations with Russia to purchase Boyevaya Mashina Desanta (BMD) armored vehicles similar to those recently delivered to neighboring Algeria (Assabah, April 20).  If true, this may suggest Morocco is engaging in an unofficial arms race with neighboring Algeria – an historic rival.

Regional Cooperation

The 28th meeting of the Arab Maghreb Union Ministerial Council was held in Tripoli on April 19. Regional integration is one of the stated aims of the ministerial council, although political obstacles have proved to be impediments to measurable progress (al-Jazeera, April 19).  Substantive discussions on regional security and cooperation are more likely to gain traction at the working level between the nations’ various security services.  Reports from the February 23 meeting of the heads of the Maghreb’s security agencies in Nouakchott indicate there is now recognition of the threat AQIM poses to regional stability. The agency heads acknowledged the threat not only to infrastructure targets within their respective countries, but also the impact terror attacks could have on the flow of commerce and migration throughout the Maghreb (Agence Mauritanienne d'Information, February 23).

Slum Eradication

The revelation that the assailants in the May 2003 Casablanca bombings hailed from the city’s vast slums gave momentum to the belief that poverty is responsible for terrorism.  Nevertheless, more complex socio-economic factors have likely contributed to fostering an environment in which the socially and economically less fortunate may be susceptible to the violent message of Salafi-Jihadis and likeminded aspirants.

Thus, one year after experiencing the worst terrorist attack ever on Moroccan soil, King Mohammad VI challenged his government to remove all of the country’s slums by 2010 under a program entitled “2004 – 2010 Cities without Slums.”  According to the United Nations, this program encompasses three principles: 1) Assess existing slums and slum households in consultation with community leaders, 2) Establish re-housing and home upgrading programs which coordinate the resources of the community, the local government, the private sector, and the state, and 3) Develop new urban centers with affordable low income housing.  Costs are estimated to run $1.7 billion and will include $540 million in government subsidies. [1]

Although Morocco has become a popular tourist destination for those seeking an exotic, yet safe location, prior to the initiation of “Cities without Slums” approximately 1.5 million Moroccans lived in slums on the outskirts of the country’s largest cities.  According to Fatna Chihab, the head of social housing at the Ministry for Habitat and Urban Planning, “Slums are a problem all over the developing world.  Morocco’s originality is that his majesty has decided to tackle the issue head on.”  To date, roughly 43 percent of the 300,000 families identified as living in urban slums have been re-housed, claimed Chihab.  The new urban areas are being purposefully designed with schools, hospitals and community centers incorporated into the plans.  (United Mediterranean Council of Industries [UMCI] News, April 21). Additional steps are being taken to provide better living conditions for the country’s rural community.  Initiatives are currently in place to bring electricity and running water to rural villages as a measure to discourage poor residents from migrating to urban areas and complicating the slum eradication efforts underway.  (UMCI News, April 21)

The Thread that Binds

The Moroccan government alone cannot surmount the counterterrorism challenges it faces.  Success will hinge on the right combination of domestic measures and the support of regional counterparts and allies abroad.  An often overlooked element will be the implementation of a coherent strategic communications plan which effectively communicates the government’s goals and objectives to its citizens and neighbors in a non-threatening manner.  Eradicating the nation’s slums and re-housing occupants is an honorable measure, but it will only be effective at stemming the tide of terrorist aspirants if it is completed in a manner which does not further disenfranchise a segment of society which has proven to be receptive to the call of violent extremism in the past.  The same logic holds true regarding the actions of Morocco’s armed forces, judiciary and security services.           

  

Matthew Chebatoris is a former U.S. Navy Cryptologist currently residing on the West Coast of the United States.  He has served in a variety of counterterrorism positions as a contract employee of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Notes:

1. “Cities without Slums Programme in Morocco to achieve a slum free target by 2010,” United Nations Human Settlement Program Report, October 2004.

The Swat Conflict: An Arc of Instability Spreading from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Xinjiang

Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari and Sadia Sulaiman

In the wake of a controversial deal that allowed the implementation of Islamic law in Pakistan’s Swat region and the establishment of what appeared to be a de facto Taliban state, Islamabad has responded with force after the Swat-based militants appeared determined to spread their presence beyond the Swat valley. The result has been some of the most serious fighting yet seen in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The government offensive has come, in part, in response to international demands for Pakistan to contain the spread of an arc of political instability through Central Asia.

On February 16, 2009, the government of the NWFP and the proscribed Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) signed a peace agreement to enforce Shari’a Nizam-e-Adl (Islamic System of Justice) in the Malakand Division and the Kohistan district of Hazara Division (Dawn [Karachi], February 17). The deal raised eyebrows within a large segment of Pakistani society and the international community, who believed that the agreement signified the defeat of the Pakistani State and a victory for the Taliban, who are dictating to the former at gun point. While the NWFP government continues to defend the peace deal, it has grave strategic and security implications that will not only imperil the domestic security of Pakistan, but also jeopardize the security of northern Afghanistan, Central Asia and China.

Strategic Importance of Malakand Division

 Malakand Division comprises one third of the NWFP, and forms the northern part of Pakistan. It is spread over an area of nearly 30,000 sq. km and has a population of 5.52 million. The Division consists of seven districts - Malakand, Buner, Swat, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Chitral. It borders Afghanistan’s Badakshan and Nuristan Provinces in the north and northwest. In the southwest, Malakand Division shares a border with the Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In the east, Malakand Division shares a border in its Chitral and Swat districts with the strategically important Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) of Pakistan (corresponding to Pakistani-controlled Kashmir), which in turn is contiguous with China’s Uyghur-inhabited Xinjiang Province in the north. In the south, Malakand shares a border with densely-inhabited Charsadda-Peshawar, Mardan and Swabi districts of the NWFP. A cursory look at the conflict-ridden Swat district reveals that it forms the core of the Malakand Division, and shares borders with all the other districts of the Division. With the exception of Chitral, which is inhabited by the Indo-Iranian Dardic language-speaking Khowar and Kalash tribes, the Malakand Division is inhabited largely by Pashtun tribes, mainly the Yousafzai. [1]

Security Ramifications of the Talibanization of Malakand

 After the February 2009 peace agreement, the TTP-Swat started to expand to the adjoining districts of Buner, Shangla, and Lower and Upper Dir under the pretext of enforcing Nizam-e-Adl. The TTP-Swat’s earlier efforts in 2007 and 2008 to penetrate the adjoining districts were effectively foiled by the joint efforts of the government and the local people.

The Swat Taliban initiated a drive to recruit locals in Swat, Buner and Shangla in an attempt to create self-sustaining local Taliban structures in these districts (Daily Times [Lahore], April 14; The News, April 16).  The TNSM, which seem to be acting as a political wing of the TTP-Swat, even attempted to enter Chitral to promote its agenda of Talibanization under the garb of Nizam-e-Adl in April. However, a local peace committee of Chitral requested TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad to postpone his visit, saying it could “create law and order problems in the area” (The News, April 17).

The expansion of the Taliban in Malakand Division is a source of grave concern. There are visible concerns within the Pakistani establishment and society that the Taliban have reached within 100 miles of the capital, Islamabad, and may seek to capture it (The News, April 20). Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) expressed his concerns in parliament on April 22, 2009, when he said, “If the Taliban continue to move at this pace, they will soon be knocking at the doors of Islamabad” (The News, April 23). More threatening is the presence of a significant number of non-local and foreign militants in Swat that pose a serious threat to northern Afghanistan, Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Province. [2]

The non-local militants within the Swat Taliban include the Waziristani Taliban. Similarly, Central Asian militants belonging to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) form the bulk of foreign militants within the TTP-Swat (Daily Times, November 7).  The IMU, while maintaining a working relationship with al-Qaeda, does not subscribe to the latter’s ideology of global jihad, preferring to wage a local struggle in Central Asia to overthrow the ex-communist regimes in these countries. [3] These Central Asian militants maintain strong bonds with elements of the TTP but are opposed by others, most notably the faction led by Ahmed Nazir, the Amir of the South Waziristan Taliban (Asian News International, August 16, 2008). According to Pakistani security officials, “a large number of [Baitullah] Mahsud’s men from Waziristan… have joined the militant forces in Swat and some 6,000 to 8,000 highly trained and well-armed militants are engaged in fighting the government forces” (Newsline [Karachi], February 2009).  In the recent takeover of Buner by the Taliban, locals reported the presence of “Afghan Tajiks” within the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban. These militants could not speak Pashtu and used interpreters to communicate with locals while forcibly taking over their properties (The News, April 22).

Given the unique geostrategic significance of Malakand Division, if the Taliban and the foreign militants are able to strengthen themselves in the region, it could negatively affect the neighboring countries. Dir and Chitral districts border Afghanistan’s comparatively stable non-Pashtun provinces in the north and the militants may try to destabilize them in the long term. The Taliban could attack the supply routes which the United States and NATO have recently negotiated with the Central Asian countries to ship supplies through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to their troops  stationed in Afghanistan (Geo TV, April 21; see also Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 7).

Chitral district also borders the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan, which is a 15-km wide stretch of land separating Pakistan from the Central Asian States. If Taliban rule is established in the Malakand area, the Central Asian militants might contemplate using Swat and Chitral as a springboard to conduct cross-border attacks in the Central Asian States. Until 2007, these Central Asian and Uyghur militants were based in Waziristan region and it was very difficult for them to conduct operations in Central Asia from there due to the distance factor. However, the strengthening of the Taliban in Swat district means that they have been able to establish a Taliban base almost 390 km north of Waziristan near the Wakhan corridor.

Swat and Chitral also border the strategically important Northern Areas of Pakistan, which share a border with the Xinjiang Province of China. This could provide a land passage to Uyghur separatist militants belonging to ETM, though the group has been largely inactive since the death of its leader, Hassan Mahsum, at the hands of Pakistani troops in 2003. The ETIM militants are presently allied with the Uzbek militants of the IMU and its splinter group, the IJU, for strategic and religious reasons. This means that strengthening of Taliban and foreign militants in Malakand Division could enable ETIM to conduct cross-border terrorist activities in the Xinjiang Province of China with more ease.

The Taliban are also attempting to establish a presence in the Kohistan and Battagram districts of Hazara Division and the Kala Dakha area of Mansehra Division, which hold immense geostrategic significance since the strategic Karakoram Highway (KKH) that connects Pakistan with China passes through these areas (Dawn, April 29). If the Taliban are able to consolidate themselves in the above mentioned areas they would be in a position to block the KKH, or create security problems that could sever the only land-link between Pakistan and China. The KKH was blocked several times by the TNSM in the 1990s to force their demand for Shari’a in Malakand.

Similarly, after establishing a permanent presence in Chitral, the Taliban could block the Lwari Pass that connects Chitral with the rest of the country. One cannot rule out the potential for the Taliban to employ the same strategy in blocking the strategic Kotal Pass in Darra Adamkhel that connects the northern districts of the NWFP with its southern districts.

Similarly, al-Qaeda’s retreat into the Safi tribe’s area of Mohmand Agency after being uprooted from the Bajaur Agency during military operations (August 2008-February 2009) is an important factor that cannot be ignored. Al-Qaeda may exploit the Talibanization of Malakand Division. FANA and Chitral have a sizeable Shi’a population, and al-Qaeda may try to provoke a Sunni-Shi’a sectarian conflict similar to the patterns of conflict witnessed in Iraq and Pakistan. This could enable al-Qaeda to flourish in the conflict-ridden areas and gather support from the Sunni extremists in the region. It might become very difficult for the Pakistani government to deploy its troops throughout the length and breadth of this 2400 km mountainous border region in order to fight militants and their terrorist infrastructure in the region. Already, Muslim Khan, spokesman of TTP-Swat, has expressed his willingness to host Osama bin Laden in Malakand (The News, April 22).

Conclusion

 Previous peace agreements with Taliban militants in North and South Waziristan from 2004-2006 have tended to strengthen the Taliban militants, who established quasi-parallel governments in the region. Similarly, the February 2009 government-TNSM peace agreement serves to bolster and further embolden the Swat Taliban. Since the TTP-Swat is not part of the agreement it does not feel itself bound by the terms of the agreement and has hence indulged in violations of the peace agreement since its implementation (Daily Times, April 15). TTP-Swat stated many times that its jihad in Afghanistan would continue against US and ISAF-NATO forces (The News, February 22).

At present, the Taliban phenomenon in Pakistan is confined to the western border with Afghanistan. Taliban activity in the Pak-Afghan border region has worsened Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, the United States and ISAF-NATO forces. However, the forward movement of the Taliban towards the north of the country may complicate Pakistan’s relations with China, Central Asia and Russia. It would push the South and Central Asia into a cauldron of violence that could jeopardize the stability of the entire region.

Sadia Sulaiman is Research Analyst at the Terrorism and Insurgency Research Unit (TIRU) at World Check, Singapore and also a Ph.D. student at Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari is Associate Research Fellow and Team Leader of South and Central Asia Desk at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

Notes:

 1. Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Swat: A Dangerous Flashpoint in the Making,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)-University of Bradford, UK, Brief No. 25, December 6, 2007, http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief25finalised.pdf

2. “Foreign Militants Also Fighting in Swat,” DG Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), February 5, 2009

3. B. Raman, “Threat to Beijing Olympics from Uyghurs,” March 10, 2008, http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/278/currentpage/4/Default.aspx

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Courtesy: Terrorism Monitor -- Volume VII, Issue 13

Terrorism Monitor is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation and is edited by Dr. Andrew McGregor, who is also the director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.