Impediments To Yingluck’s New Approach For Southern Thailand – Analysis
By Panchali Saikia
The violence of the ethnic separatist insurgency in the southern
provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) continues unabated,
raising the brutality to the level of international terrorism by
targeting foreign tourists. The recent triple bombing attack in the
Sungai Kolok district of Narathiwat province on 16 September 2011
revealed one such purpose of the insurgents.
An overview report of the last one year shows that although there is a
considerable decrease in the number of attacks by insurgents in
Thailand, the fatalities and lethality have increased. Violence has now
become more retaliatory in nature and the attacks are professionally
done; they are well planned and targeted.
However, hope lies with the change in the political climate in
Thailand. With the victory of the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) in the July 2011
elections, there is a lot of expectation from the new Prime Minster
Yingluck Shinawatra towards bringing peace and stability in the country.
Yingluck’s new approach
Bringing political stability to a country exhausted by five years of
political turmoil and more importantly, restoring peace in the south
will be a major task for the new government. The issue of insurgency has
always been overshadowed by national political disputes in Bangkok.
Yingluck will have to carefully balance the political situation in
Bangkok along with her policies to combat insurgency.
In her election campaign, she promised to implement new policies for
the south, such as increasing the number of Muslims who could go on the
annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, focus on greater public input in
decision-making, and establish a special administrative zone in the
these provinces. But, no such policy has been declared since she took
over as the premier.
However, one positive step of the new government is notable ie
reviving the national agenda on ‘war on drugs’ which was initiated by
Thaksin Shinawatra during his premiership. Yingluck’s agenda focuses on
six objectives – from reducing drugs related problems to minimizing drug
abuses and increasing resistance to drug trafficking along the borders.
This will be a major setback for the insurgents as most of their funds
are generated from smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal trade. The
insurgents have reacted furiously to this and have waged a series of
retaliatory attacks. The Sungai Kolok bomb blast, the series of attacks
on the defence volunteers (recruited by the Royal Thai Army to combat
insurgency in south) and security officials, and the bomb blast at the
Narathiwat 31st special task force military base are a few instances
where militants have tried to challenge state efforts to combat
insurgency.
Lack of public support in south
It will not be easy for the government to implement new policies or
track insurgents and resist drug trafficking without public support in
this region. Yingluck will have to struggle in this regard; her lack of
public support in these provinces is evident from the fact that despite
many promises made during her campaign, her party could not win a single
seat in the south.
Furthermore, she will have to face the consequences of her brother
Thaksin’s negative reputation in this region. Thaksin had to face deep
resentment in these provinces during his premiership due to his
aggressive counter-insurgency policies. The brutal crackdown by police
forces in Krue Se mosque and the Tak-Bai incident where detainees were
harassed in October 2004 exacerbated hatred for him among the
communities in the south. This is not a positive sign for her party and
garnering broader public support and developing new policies for these
provinces will be quite difficult.
Military opposition
Another major challenge is resentment from the military. The intense
political instability in Bangkok and the continuous opposition from the
army had posed serious challenges for Yingluck’s predecessors to
implement their policies in combating militants effectively. The
military and the government have often had disagreements on
counter-insurgency policies to fight the insurgents. Yingluck is also
concerned that challenging military decisions might result in defections
in the coalition government. As the military is backing the opposition,
they may pressurize the coalition parties and influence individual
party members to dissolve the government.
The army Commander-in-Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha has already
rejected Yingluck’s policy proposal for the south and highly criticized
her policy for national reconciliation. Yingluck’s policy to give
autonomy to these provinces will also not be accepted by the military as
this will undermine their power in the region.
Disagreements are evident within the PTP on the decision to give
autonomy and any negative impact of such a policy might create a rift
between Yingluck and her party members. The Deputy Prime Minister and
Interior Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit has also opposed the national
reconciliation proposal, especially disagreeing with the inclusion of
the southern unrest as a part of the process. Wichaidit, who is also the
chairman of the committee that monitors the government’s implementation
of the Truth for Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) proposals feels that
the violent incidents in the south are allied to criminal activities
and not political motives. This is against the TRC agenda which
emphasizes only rehabilitating victims of political conflict.
Although it is too early to expect positive results, it will be
interesting to see how Yingluck proceeds in implementing reforms in this
seemingly intractable war with continuous opposition and interference
from the military and without any representatives of her party in these
provinces.
Panchali Saikia
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
email: panchali@ipcs.org
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
email: panchali@ipcs.org
Source: Eurasiareview
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