internal terror

Source: DNA INDIA
For some time now, attacks by Maoist groups have been limited to parts of Central India -- Maharashtra, where Naxalites are known to operate has been quiet. This changed on Sunday and in a most brutal manner when a large group of well armed Naxalites stormed a village and massacred a posse of 15 policemen who had come to the village.

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Eyewitness accounts of the incident are chilling -- the Naxalites fired indiscriminately on the policemen and killed them; the bodies found were mutiliated with their eyes pierced and hand or legs chopped off. Some reports have claimed that women Maoists led the group.
Chief minister Ashok Chavan has bravely claimed that the state will retaliate and that the army need not be called to manage the situation, but his words mean little if his police department finds itself without the weapons or strategy to fight back. Experts have talked about a 'Red Corridor' extending from Andhra Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh.
While Naxalite groups in different states may not always coordinate with each other, there is no denying that large swathes of the hinterland are out of the state's control. Clearly this is an untenable situation in need of quick resolution.
The Salwa Judum, or so-called self-protection groups promoted by the Chattisgarh government have proved to be unpopular and ineffective and state police units have found themselves out of their depth in understanding, much less handling Maoism. A proposal to have a special task force has been a non-starter.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's description of Naxalism as a "virus" is apt and this virus is spreading rapidly.TheIndian state has become preoccupied with externally-sponsored terrorism but internal terrorism is no less a scourge.
There are socio-economic reasons why Naxalites thrive; they are seen as helping tribal and disadvantaged groups in rural areaswhere the state's delivery systems have failed. There are political issues too, because Maoists propogate an ultra-left ideology. All these should be incorporated in any strategy to deal with them. Not much thinking seems to have gone into this.
But it is also a major security issue and even here, worryingly, the states have failed as many such spectacular attacks in recent years show. Maharashtra and the Centre must see this incident as a major wake up call and refurbish their tactics in tackling Naxalism before more such attacks occur.

Tempt Maoists if you can't beat them

Source: INDIA TODAY
If you can't beat them, join them. Or better still, make them join you!
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram perhaps wants the Jharkhand government to try exactly this by formulating an attractive surrender policy for the Maoists, one which can make the rebels join the mainstream.
So far, almost 100 Naxalites have surrendered in Jharkhand during different regimes. But, in the absence of their proper rehabilitation, the remaining Maoists rebels have shunned the state's offer.
Chidambaram, who was in Jharkhand recently to review the state's preparedness against the Naxalites, has suggested Jharkhand to work out its own surrender policy, "as only a state can evolve specific policy keeping in mind its specific geographical and social landscape".
Obviously, the argument in favour of states preparing their own policies was that a national policy on surrender cannot carry the weight and complication of the extremist problem having local overtones. Chidambaram, however, clarified that the Centre may provide financial assistance to the states.
This was Chidambaram's first visit to Jharkhand since he became the home minister late last year.

Jharkhand's history of Naxal violence Click here


In terms of strategic realism, the Centre seems convinced that now was the right time to introduce a surrender policy because unlike 2007-08 when the country witnessed and withstood a sharp rise in extremist activities, the security forces have gained an upper hand in 2008.
"With their back to the wall, the Naxalites may now see some reasons to accept the surrender policy," said a senior Jharkhand IPS officer.
No wonder Jharkhand officials are busy giving final touches to the draft of a new surrender policy, which they believe would motivate the Maoists rebels to abhor violence and return to the mainstream.
The Jharkhand police headquarters is believed to have supported continuance of hard anti-Naxalite operations to go along with the surrender policy because such policies work only when police are in a position of strength and the Naxalites are on the run.
There are, however, just too many questions over the efficacy of a surrender policy because the "bait" of a fixed monthly salary is unlikely to lure the rebels just because the Naxalites earn crores in the form of "levy".
According to sources, the new surrender policy draft has borrowed heavily from a similar draft prepared in 2006 but could not be implemented because of serious difference of opinions within the then cabinet under Arjun Munda government.
The policy had then promised extremists cash compensation, reward, land, employment, free housing, healthcare and education, life insurance, monthly stipend, vocational training, fast-track courts, provision to condone sentences, reimbursement for firearms, a mechanism to settle land disputes and financial inducements to villages and NGOs motivating surrender.
Incidentally, the proposed policy has been left hanging by previous governments for quite some time now. The successive governments led by Arjun Munda, Madhu Koda and Shibu Soren have been dilly-dallying the finalisation.
Beyond surrender policy, Chidambaram was informed that as many as 145 police stations in Jharkhand were located in areas heavily infested by the Maoist rebels. The home minister also issued instructions to set up police stations in 25 blocks of Jharkhand, which do not have any.
The minister's visit to Jharkhand also assumed special significance since this was one state where Chidambaram's idea of inter-state join operation against Naxalites has failed to fructify because of a neighbour's reluctance.
In fact, Chidambaram admitted that the hot-pursuit and barrier-free crackdown on Maoists was being carried out by the police forces of various states except West Bengal, which has not allowed the Jharkhand police to enter its territory. In fact, Jharkhand has lodged a formal complaint with Chidambaram on this issue.
"We told the Union home minister that West Bengal's reluctance to be part of any joint operation against the ultras has turned out to be a stumbling block in the fight against Naxalism," said a Jharkhand IPS officer.
The minister has promised to work it out with West Bengal, adding that Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar were already carrying out joint operations.
Earlier on January 7, when Chidambaram had a meeting with chief ministers of all the Maoist-hit states, a consensus was reached on conducting joint operations against the Maoists rebels.
The minister's maiden visit, however, failed to lift the veil over the fate of Jharkhand's suspended assembly, as he said it was for the political parties in the state to decide in which direction they wanted to go.
President's rule was clamped in Jharkhand on January 19 after the UPA alliance partners failed to reach a consensus over Shibu Soren's successor, as the JMM chief had to resign from the chief minister's chair following his defeat at the January 8 Tamar bypoll.

Maoist rebels kill 15 police in India: officer

Source: AFP

23 hours ago

MUMBAI (AFP) — Fifteen police officers were killed in the western Indian state of Maharashtra in a shoot-out with leftist militants, police said Monday.
They were ambushed Sunday in jungle near a village in the east of the state, a stronghold of so-called Naxalites -- Communist-, Maoist- and Marxist-inspired groups who claim to represent oppressed, landless rural dwellers.
"The patrolling party was ambushed by the Naxalites and 15 of our men died. The encounter went on for nearly one and a half to two hours," state police chief A.N. Roy told AFP by telephone.
"Our people also fired, killing and injuring some Naxalites."
Roy said there were regular skirmishes between police and militants in the area, which is close to the border with neighbouring Madhya Pradesh and some 1,000 kilometres (620 miles) by road from the Maharahstra state capital Mumbai.
Indian media on Monday said the militants fled with police weapons, including automatic assault rifles and a mortar shell. But Roy categorically denied reports that the policemen's bodies were mutilated.
The worst Naxalite attack on police in Maharashtra had shocked the force, the officer said, adding that there was a "renewed determination" to tackle the militants.
"We will continue the fight and not let their sacrifices go in vain," he said.
The Maoist insurgency, which grew out of a peasant uprising in 1967, his hit more than half of India's 29 states and the rebels use a heavily forested region in Chhattisgarh as their headquarters.

Terrorism will continue to threaten India: expert

Source: Dailytimes

By M. Ziauddin

LONDON, Feb 1: India will continue to face a serious jihadi terrorist threat but lacks military options that have strategic-level effects without a significant risk of a military response by Pakistan.This is one of the key conclusions arrived at by Brian Michael Jenkins of US-based think tank Rand Corporation in his testimony (Terrorists can think strategically lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks) presented before the US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee last week (Jan 28).

Another key conclusion of this testimony gleaned from RC’s website is: The focus on Pakistan in this case should not obscure the likelihood that the attackers had local assistance or that other recent terrorist attacks in India appear to have been carried out wholly or partially by Indian nationals. Local radicalisation is a major goal of the terrorists and will remain a major political and social challenge for India.Mr Jenkins believes that neither Indian nor US policy is likely to be able to reduce that threat significantly in the short to medium term. He says most likely the threat will continue to grow and adds significantly, “Other extremists in India inevitably will find inspiration and instruction from the Mumbai attack.”

He declares that safe havens would continue to be key enablers for terrorist groups as they “allow terrorist leaders to recruit, select and train their operators and make it easier for terrorists to plan and execute complex operations, such as the Mumbai attack”.Therefore, at the strategic level, the Mumbai attack underscores, according to Mr Jenkins, the imperative of addressing the trans-national sources of Islamist terrorism in India.

How to do this is an extraordinarily difficult question that will require, he says, the reassessment of basic assumptions concerning policy towards Pakistan by members of the international community.Discussing Pakistan specifically in his testimony, Mr Jenkins says Pakistan continues to play a prominent and problematic role in the overlapping armed conflicts and terrorist campaigns in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan itself.

Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other insurgent and terrorist groups find sanctuary in Pakistan’s turbulent tribal areas.“Pakistan’s principal defence against external pressure is not its nuclear arsenal, but its own political fragility — its government’s less-than-full cooperation is preferable to the country’s collapse and descent into chaos.

“Historically, some of them (terrorist organisations) have drawn on support from the Pakistan government itself. While the government of Pakistan has been helpful in capturing some key terrorist operatives, Pakistan is accused of protecting others. And it has been understandably reluctant to use military force against its own citizens in the remote tribal areas where these groups reside. When it has used military force, government forces have not fared well.“Public sentiment imposes further constraints. Many Pakistanis regard India and the United States, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, as greater threats to Pakistan’s national security. This was perceived as an obstacle to US counter-terrorist efforts even before 9/11.”

analysis: Dealing with a common enemy —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Source: Daily times (Pakistan)
Terrorism is a common enemy of Pakistan and India and this challenge cannot be addressed adequately if these countries do not abandon the current negativity in their interaction. There is a need to return to positive diplomacy and cooperation to combat terrorism.

The Mumbai terrorist attacks were a tragic reminder of the growing threat of terrorism in South Asia, which has extremely negative implications for harmony and stability in the domestic, regional and global contexts. Some extremist groups have acquired the capacity to violently challenge internal order in a state and create extremely problematic situations in inter-state relations. Their actions aim at creating anarchy and undermine the state’s capacity to function as an effective political and administrative entity.

Terrorism and democracy cannot co-exist. These transnational terrorist groups have to be neutralised if democracy and stability are to be secured. This is especially important for countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh that have returned to democracy in the recent past. The Mumbai incident strengthens extremist and hard line political forces in India and marginalises those standing for democracy, peace and good neighbourly relations.

The Indian and Pakistani responses to the Mumbai attack showed that the two states lack a coherent and shared approach to deal with such situations. The home secretaries of India and Pakistan had met in Islamabad on November 25-26, 2008 and reaffirmed their resolve to cooperate with each other for combating the menace of terrorism. Pakistan’s foreign minister was in New Delhi on a peace and goodwill mission when the Mumbai attacks took place. These diplomatic overtures were the first victims of the Mumbai incident.The response of India and Pakistan to the Mumbai incident could be described as episodic, highly nationalistic and shortsighted. Both wanted to play safe by returning to the traditional India-Pakistan confrontation framework. Their initial responses were shaped mainly by mutual distrust and hostility rather than by a desire to view the Mumbai attacks as a challenge that required cool-headed analysis and cooperation.

The task of the Indian government was made difficult by Indian private sector TV news channels that sensationalised the incident. Some anchorpersons openly engaged in Pakistan bashing; some virtually declared war on Pakistan. Their counterparts in Pakistan went on the defensive, arguing that India had started maligning Pakistan before the identity of the terrorists was established. They further accused India of covert efforts to destabilise Pakistan.As compared to the Indian response to the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh avoided some extreme steps like snapping off all communication and trade, recall of ambassadors and reduction of staff of the embassies, and troop mobilisation to the border.This time, the response was tough but measured to avoid an eyeball-to-eyeball military confrontation on the border that could escalate to an all-out war.

The changed strategy reflected a rethink in India on ways to deal with Pakistan in a situation of serious conflict. The 2001-02 Indian troop mobilisation did not extract any concession from Pakistan, which had also moved its troops to the border. India withdrew these troops unilaterally in October to peacetime positions.In the subsequent period, the Indian strategic community explored other punitive options for dealing with Pakistan keeping in mind the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

They suggested surgical airstrikes or swift commando raids on militant training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, limited war rather than a full-fledged war, and Cold Start, which also discarded the notion of total mobilisation of troops to the border with Pakistan.Therefore, instead of full mobilisation, the Indian government moved some troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the border, but not on the border. Good sense prevailed with the policy makers who decided not to invoke the newly articulated notions of punitive military action against Pakistan.Instead, India launched a comprehensive and aggressive diplomatic offensive against Pakistan with the objective of undermining Pakistan’s reputation and isolating it at the international level.

India would like the international community, especially the United Nations, to declare Pakistan a terrorist state and impose sanctions. The US and European states sympathise with India and are pressuring Pakistan to control terrorist groups based in Pakistan. However, they do not share the Indian aim of isolating Pakistan or designating it a terrorist state. This has caused some anger in India but has also injected realism in its policy towards Pakistan, although the Indian leadership is continuing with its tough rhetoric to deflect pressure from the political right and hard line Hindu groups.

Pakistan’s initial response to the Mumbai incident was confused and the government went into an unrealistic denial mode, i.e. the arrested terrorist and others were not Pakistanis, although some Pakistani TV news channels had provided enough evidence to show that the surviving terrorist belonged to a village in Pakistani Punjab.It took prodding by friendly countries and an internal re-assessment after Pakistan received a dossier from India in the first week of January that the Pakistani government decided to closely examine the linkages between the Mumbai terrorists and Pakistan’s militant groups. Pakistan had earlier banned Jama’at-ud Dawa and detained its leaders.The main victim of the terror incident is the peace process.

Though interaction between India and Pakistan, especially trade and travel, has not been broken off, it has slowed down because of unannounced bureaucratic hold-ups. If the present trends continue, these relations may not be sustainable.This complex and difficult Indo-Pakistan situation led two societal groups, i.e. South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR) and the South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA), to put together a non-official delegation comprising people belonging to civil society groups, political parties and the media that visited New Delhi recently to talk on these issues with their counterparts there.The visit provided a useful opportunity to civil society groups from both countries to exchange views on terrorism and India-Pakistan relations unhindered by official sensitivities.

The people in India expressed strong anger against Pakistan and outlined what could happen if a Pakistan-based terrorist group launched another attack. Such an attack would completely marginalise those who advocate diplomacy and direct interaction for resolution of all problems, including terror related issues.The Indian response is not monolithic. The opinions expressed included a hard line towards Pakistan; anger, anxiety and concern about terrorism; the desire to work through diplomatic channels; support for Pakistan’s current democratic dispensation; and the need to revive normal interaction.

However, there was near unanimity on the view that Pakistan must provide a credible response to the Indian dossier, showing seriousness in dealing with terrorist groups.Despite the tough political statements by Indian government officials and aggressive comments by hard line Hindu groups, the prospects of revival of normal interaction between India and Pakistan are discernable in New Delhi. Much depends on how Pakistan deals with the Indian dossier, in terms of credibility of response and the kind of administrative and legal action that will be taken to neutralise terrorist groups.

However, there is a lack of understanding in India of how terrorism has become a threat to Pakistan’s internal stability; they are more focused on their own problems.Terrorism is a common enemy of Pakistan and India and this challenge cannot be addressed adequately if these countries do not abandon the current negativity in their interaction. There is a need to return to positive diplomacy and cooperation to combat terrorism.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

US think-tank warns of more attacks on city

3 Feb 2009, 0234 hrs IST,
S Balakrishnan, TNN :

MUMBAI: The Rand Corporation, a highly-respected US think-tank, has warned of more terror strikes in India in the "forseeable future''. It has also stated that the 26/11 Mumbai attack had "local assistance''. TOI was the first to report about the Lashkar-e-Taiba "fidayeens'' getting local support to carry out their operation. But the investigators are still to explore the local angle.
The warning of future attacks came in the course of a testimony given by Brian Jenkins of the corporation before the US senate committee on homeland security and government affairs on January 28. It is titled `Lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks'.
Jenkins said India will continued to face a serious jihadi terrorist threat from Pakistan-based terrorist groups. "India lacks military options that have strategic-level effects without a significant risk of a military response by Pakistan. Neither the Indian or US policy is likely to be able to reduce that threat significantly in the short to medium-term. Most likely, the threat will continue to grow. Other extremists in India will inevitably find inspiration and instruction from the Mumbai attacks,'' he observed.
Apart from targeting the high-profile Taj and Trident hotels, which have a large number of foreigners, the 26/11 attackers also targeted ordinary people at CST rail terminus, Jews at Nariman Point and foreigners at Leopold Cafe.
Jenkins said, terrorists designed the Mumbai attack to do what the authorities were not expecting. "There were no truck bombs or people attempting to smuggle bombs onto trains, as in previous attacks. Since attacks against high-profile soft targets are relatively easy and cheap to mount, such institutions will remain targets of future attacks. Many of India's older symbolic buildings were not built with security considerations in mind or are at exposed locations.
Indian security agencies have taken Jenkin's analysis seriously and are urging the government to take appropriate measures.

'Pakistan must close Taliban bases that train anti-India militants'

31 Jan 2009, 1240 hrs IST, IANS

WASHINGTON: Getting Islamabad's cooperation to close Taliban sanctuaries in its tribal areas may be Washington's single hardest challenge as Pakistan has always used them to train people to operate in Kashmir or India, says a leading US expert.
Bruce O. Riedel, an expert on South Asia who has worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pentagon and National Security Council, says new special envoy Richard Holbrooke needs to reverse the negative momentum in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The Taliban's military successes in Afghanistan have to be reversed and Islamabad must help close their sanctuaries on Pakistani territory, he said in an interview at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Washington think tank.
But Riedel says "trying to get that cooperation out of the Pakistani government in my judgment will be the single hardest test that Ambassador Holbrooke faces and in fact may be the single hardest foreign policy challenge President (Barack) Obama faces". The Pakistani military is of two minds about the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan, he said.
It has always used FATA "as the place where it could create groups like the Taliban, or encourage the development of the Taliban, where it could train people to operate in Kashmir or to operate in India".
"But now that it sees that it's losing control of that area, it's increasingly concerned about the future," Riedel added.
US Predator attacks on al-Qaida targets in that area had scored some important successes, but they had also helped further the alienation of the Pakistani people away from the US and badly eroded American brand image, Riedel said.
"Polling in Pakistan shows that a majority of Pakistanis blame America for the country's internal violence. India comes in second place, and the al-Qaida and militancy comes in third place," he said. "Any time that you are outpolling India as the bad guy in Pakistan, you're in deep, deep trouble."
Pakistan's concerns in Afghanistan derive in large part from its concerns about India, the expert said.
"It can't try to deal with these problems in isolation. But you also have to deal with them with a great degree of subtlety and sophistication, because there are decades-old fears among all the parties about American intentions," Riedel said.